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THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY:
CRISIS IN THE COMMON MARKET
ROLAND L. HJORTH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The President of the Commission of the European Economic Com-
munity has referred to the Common Market as "a kind of peaceful
three-stage rocket. The first stage is that of customs union; the sec-
ond, economic union; and the third, political union."' To the extent
that attaining economic or political union involves the assignment of
law-making powers from nation states to supranational institutions-
or the substitution of supranational2 for national law-the Common
Market has gone further in agriculture than in any other sector of its
economy.' European farm economies have been planned economies;'
the common agricultural policy of the Common Market has therefore
entailed the creation of a planned agricultural economy on a Commu-
nity scale, requiring the preemption of national legislation by Com-
munity legislation.
The agricultural policy of the Member States is being increasingly deter-
mined by the common agricultural policy. The period when it seemed
possible to take decisions on domestic agricultural policy irrespective of
the common agricultural policy is now over. No member Government and
no Parliament can in [the] future take independent decisions having no
reference to the common agricultural policy which is now in force.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 HALLSTEIN, NATO and the European Ecowmic Community, in KRAUSE, THE
CoMMoN MARKET, PROGRESS AND CONTROVERSY 53 (1965).
2 In the words of Robert Schuman, supranationalism is "a new step in the grada-
tion of powers." Supranational laws are adopted by institutions which are above states.
As in federations, supranational laws may be directly binding on individuals, but unlike
federations, the power of enforcement of the laws rests ultimately on the states rather
than the "supranational" entity. See Robertson, Legal Problems of European Inte-
gration, 91 REcEuHI DES CouRs 105, 143-48 (1957), reprinted in STEIN & HAY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ATLANTIC AREA 4649
(1963).3 
"[A]n extended network of European economic guidance law has emerged in the
area of agriculture and commerce in agricultural products. . . !" G6tz, Europaisches
Getreidepreisrecht, 18 JURISTENZEITUNG 157 (1963). See Megret, Principes Du Regime
Applicable A L'Agriculture Dans Le Marche Commun, 7 REVuE Du MARcHt Com-
MxN 267, 269 (1964). (All quotations from French and German sources are author's
translations unless otherwise indicated.)
4 See generally, TRACY, AGRICULrURE IN WESTERN EUROPE (1964); Coppocx,
NORTH ATLANTIC POLICY-THE AGRICULTURE G"r, (1963).
G General Significance and Scope of Council Regulations of 23 December 1963, in
EEC Bulletin, Feb., 1964, pp. 40, 42. Megret, supra note 3, at 269 states that "Agri-
culture constitutes the first and only example of European legislation and regulation
in the full sense of the word."
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The future of this common agricultural policy, as well as that of the
European Economic Community itself, however, has been made some-
what uncertain by France's decree, on July 1, 1965, of a "temporary
boycott" of the meetings of the Council of Ministers of the Community
due to a failure to agree upon the method of financing the Community's
agricultural policy.6 This boycott may well have "triggered the most
serious crisis in the bloc's seven year history,"7 because the dispute is
thought by some to be a mere symptom of a more fundamental conflict
between France and her Common Market partners. The issue in that
conflict is whether the Common Market is to become an integrated
entity of member nations, or is rather to be only a loosely-knit organi-
zation of states as envisioned by French President De Gaulle.' Be-
cause the integration of planned agricultural economies requires a
greater degree of supranationalism than does the integration of free-
market industrial economies, it is natural that the political differences
between De Gaulle and his partners should clash most vividly in the
execution of the common agricultural policy. The purpose of this
article is to review this common agricultural policy and its implemen-
tation. Apart from considerations of European unity, the common
agricultural policy is of significance to exporters of American agricul-
tural products. The value of annual exports of these products amounts
to about five billion dollars, of which one and three-tenths billion dol-
lars has been sold to Common Market countries alone.' The common
agricultural policy should also concern legal scholars because it is
probably the most highly developed form of "supranational" law and
institutional regulation in the world.'"
6 See the declaration of the French government in Le Monde, July 2, 1965, p. 2,
cols. 1 & 2; The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1965, p. 18, cols. 1-6; Metzger, Der 30.
Juni, Ein Schwarzer Tag Fiir die EWG, Darmstaidter Echo, July 24, 1965, p. 3, cols. 1-3.
7 The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1965, p. 22. See Le Monde, July 3, 1965, p. 1,
cols. 2 & 3; p. 2, col. 4, and p. 3.
8 Ibid. The dispute between DeGaulle on the one hand and the "Europeans" on the
other is well-known and ancient See Stein, The New Institutions, in 1 STEIN & NicH-
OLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL
PROFILE 33, 97 (1960). Although Germany has minimized the effect of France's action,
France has indicated she will "draw economic, political and legal conclusions from the
failure of the negotiations in Brussels." Darmstiidter Echo, July 2, 1965, p. 1.
9 Soth, U.S. Agriculture in the Common Market in KRAUSE, Op. Cit. supra note 1, at
32. Agricultural exports account for one-fourth of the total nonmilitary exports of the
United States. Kravis, The U.S. Trade Position and the Common Market in KRAUSE,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 138.
10 See Megret, supra note 3, at 269.
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II. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
A. Customs Unions-Potentials and Limitations
A customs union, the "first stage" of the Common Market,"1 arises
from "the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more
customs territories," so that (1) tariffs, quotas and other restrictions
upon trade between member states of the customs union are eliminated
and (2) each member state applies substantially the same tariffs and
other regulations of commerce in respect to trade with "non-member"
or "third" countries." The Treaty of Rome' (as supplemented by de-
cisions of the Council taken in January 1962)1" requires that the Euro-
pean Economic Community become a customs union in gradual steps
during a transitional period ending no later than January 1970."
Before the emergence of the present crisis there was reason to believe
that because of past accelerations, the customs union could be estab-
lished by July 1, 1967, in accordance with further accelerations pro-
posed by the Commission. While the present crisis does not of itself
undo the intra-community trade liberalization that has taken place in
the past, it weakens the possibility of adoption of the provisions re-
quired to bring about a customs union by 1967,1" and more remotely
endangers the very existence of the Common Market.
One purpose of a customs union is to bring about optimum utiliza-
"I See text accompanying note 1, supra.
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV. Since the agreement calls
for "most-favored nation" treatment, signatories are not as a general rule allowed to
lower tariffs in respect of one signatory without making equal concessions to all other
signatories. A customs union, which is per se in violation of this principle, is an excep-
tion allowed in the agreement. Exception is also made for "free trade areas," which
differ from customs unions in that member states maintain separate external trade
policies, although trade restrictions within the free trade area are abolished. Ibid.
23 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
ratified by the Member States of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands during that year and effective as of January 1, 1958. (Hereinafter
cited as the Treaty.) Quotations from the Treaty cited herein conform to the unofficial
translation published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office (1962).
14 Council Decision concerning passage to the second stage of the transitional period,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUXAUTPS EUROPEPNNES (hereinafter cited as J.O.C.E.)
164/62.
" The customs union is to be accomplished gradually in a transitional period of three
stages of four years each. See generally Ouin, The Establishment of the Customs
Union in 1 STEIx & NICHOLSON, op. cit. supra note 8 at 101-88. The first stage could
have been extended to six years, but the decision in note 14 caused the Community to
enter its second stage after four years-see Treaty, arts. 8, 12-37.
"' See Initiative 1964 in supplement to EEC Bulletin, Feb., 1965, p. 6.
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tion of the factors of production. When intra-community customs and
other trade restrictions are removed, the relatively inefficient producers
of one member state are no longer protected by tariffs or other trade
restrictions from the competition of the more efficient producers of
another member state. The relatively efficient producers in each state
will penetrate the markets of other member states and inefficient pro-
ducers will move into other types of activity." However, it takes more
than a customs union to make a Common Market if by "Common
Market" one means an area comprised of several states in which eco-
nomic conditions are made similar to those existing in one internal
market.
Optimum utilization of factors of production requires not only the
removal of barriers to competition, which can be effected by means of
a customs union, but requires also the equalization of those conditions
of competition which are attributable to actions of the state, such as
taxes, subsidies, support programs, etc. A customs union does not of
itself equalize these state-created artificial conditions of competition,
and may actually aggravate distortions of competition caused by vari-
ations in laws and policies of member states.
Assume, for example, that German producers can produce a product
for 100 dollars, but that German turnover taxes of 20 dollars are im-
posed upon the sale of the product, bringing the total cost to 120
dollars. If French producers can produce the same product for 105
dollars, but the French turnover tax is only 5 dollars, the total cost to
the French producer is only 110 dollars. Although the German pro-
ducer is more efficient, the French producer would gain a competitive
advantage over the former in a customs union-even in the German
market-unless special measures were taken to offset cost-disparities
attributable to differences in tax policy.18 This is only one way in which
17 Compare MFDE, PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC UNION 9-13 (1953) with ViNER, THE
CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE, passim (1950), both reproduced in part in SmIN & HAY, LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ATLANTIC AREA 77 & 116 (1963). A customs union can
lead to distortions in world trade as a result of the Community preference. Assume
for example the import by Germany of identical products from the United States and
France for respective costs of $30 and $50. If a $30 customs duty is imposed, the
United States exporter can undersell the French exporter. But if a customs union is
created, the $20 competitive advantage of the American exporter could be erased com-
pletely by an elimination of the duty on the French product. See VINER, supra. In
addition, of course, a "Common Market" means a larger market, thus serving as the
basis for larger enterprises which can take additional advantages of economies involved
in large-scale production. See FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 142-50(1961).
18 The Treaty authorizes special measures. In the given example Germany could,
under articles 95 & 96, forgive the tax on goods exported to France and impose a $15
tax on imports from France (or $20, if France also forgives the French tax on French
goods exported to Germany). See note 20, injra.
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government policy can effect competitive capacity. In the same ex-
ample, France could create an artificial advantage for its producers,
even if no turnover taxes were imposed in either country, by granting
a subsidy to its producers. Prior to becoming a member of the customs
union, Germany could protect its producers, at least in the German
market, by imposing a tariff on French imports to offset the artificial
advantage of the French producer." Unless special measures are
adopted, a customs union takes away this protection.
B. Overcoming Trade Distorting Effects of Divergent National Laws
Trade distortions caused by divergencies in national laws can be
handled within the framework of a customs union in many ways.
First, exceptions to the general rule of intra-community tariff abolition
can be created to enable one member state to protect its domestic pro-
ducers against the artificial advantages enjoyed by producers in an-
other member state. For example, one member state might be allowed
to apply a "countervailing duty" against certain imports from another
member state to offset subsidies granted to producers in that state.
While such a duty might prevent distortion, however, it does not pro-
mote the integration a customs union seeks to bring about, because
even though the countervailing duty may protect the German producer
in the German market, it does not enable him to penetrate the French
market.20
A second way to deal with this problem is to remove disparities in
national laws by harmonizing those laws, so that "where disparities in
national laws contribute to disparities in the cost of production and
competitive conditions generally, approximation of laws in selected
areas ... [will] act as a catalyst in the automatic levelling-off process
inherent in the Common Market."'" The Treaty therefore authorizes
the Council of Ministers, acting upon proposals of the Commission, to
19 This problem can be met in the Community as to agricultural products by use of
"countervailing duties" authorized under certain conditions by article 46. Subsidies in
respect of goods other than agricultural produce are prohibited to the extent they
distort or threaten to distort competition. Treaty, art. 92.
20 The Treaty authorizes countervailing duties only to a very limited extent. See
Treaty, arts. 46, 97 & 98. The problem of variations in tax policy posed in the example
can also be dealt with by allowing German producers a "drawback" on exports to
France, equal to the amount of German tax imposed. France could then impose its
standard tax on the imported product. Treaty, arts. 95 & 96. Although this neutralizes
the effect of variations in domestic tax laws, the procedure does create "fiscal fron-
ters," i.e., administrative barriers to trade. Cf. Antal, HarmonLcation of Turnover
Taxes in the Common Market, 1 C.M.L. REv. 41 (1963).
21 Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58
A-.t. J. INT. L. 1, 29 (1964).
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issue directives to member states requiring member states to remove
competition-distorting disparities in national laws.22
Another method of eliminating these disparities is to replace national
laws by one supranational law. This method is similar to approxima-
tion of laws, but one important difference is that directives to member
states to approximate laws usually require only the elimination of dis-
parities in laws-they do not enable the Community to establish its
own policy. A power to enact a supranational or Community-wide
law, on the other hand, enables the Community not only to bring about
uniformity, but to dictate the direction in which that uniformity is to
move. For this reason, if there is to be a Community policy in a posi-
tive sense, there must be a Community law-making power consisting
of more than a power to prevent or eliminate trade-distorting differ-
ences in laws.
C. Customs Unions and the Agricultural Economy
It can be seen that the economic integration of a customs union re-
quires many special measures to overcome trade-distorting effects of
variations in national laws and policies. The most extreme type of
measure-substitution of Community laws for national laws-is the
method by which the Common Market hopes to achieve integration of
its agricultural markets. The Treaty of Rome creates a Community
law-making power only when such a power is specifically authorized in
the Treaty. This specific authorization has been given to the Commu-
nity institutions 4 in the area of agricultural production and trade
because integration of the agricultural economies of the Common Mar-
ket requires more than the creation of a customs union coupled with
22 Treaty, art. 101. These directives had to be adopted by the Council unanimously
during the first stage of the transitional period, i.e., to December 31, 1962, but may now
be adopted by qualified majority. Ibid. The Council is also authorized to issue direc-
tives calling for approximation of "such legislative and administrative provisions as
directly affect the establishment or operation of the Common Market," but where
distortion of competition cannot be shown, such directives can only be issued by unani-
mous vote, even after the transitional period has expired. Treaty, art. 100. It is some-
times difficult to show whether or not differences in laws "distort competition" and
therefore whether directives calling for harmonization should be based upon article 100,
101, or some more specific authorization. To avoid possible invalidation by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, directives issued so far have usually been based not only upon
article 101, but upon more specific provisions as well, such as article 99 (basis for pro-
posed directive relating to harmonization of turnover tax laws) and article 43 (basis
for directive relating to approximation of foodstuffs regulations). RAPPORT FAIr AU
NOM DE LA COMMISSION JURIDIQUE SUR L'HARMONIZATION DES LEGISLATIONS EURO-
PEtNNES, J.O.C.E. No. 54, 11-14 (June 8, 1965). See generally 1 CCH COMMON
MKT. REP. I f[ 3300-3552.
23 See CATALANO, MANUEL DE DROIT DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEtNNES 108-12
(1962).
24 Treaty, arts. 40 & 43. See discussion in G6tz, Europiiisches Getreidepreisrecht, 18
JURISTENZEITUNG 157 (1963).
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the elimination of trade distorting variations in national laws. At least
three factors point to the necessity of additional measures:
(1) Customs duties and quantitative restrictions in many cases are
not the essential elements of protection and organization of national
agricultural markets.
Member states in the past have not relied on customs duties as the
primary regulatory device for controlling foreign trade in agriculture.
National import monopolies were often formed to buy products from
abroad at world market prices and resell the produce within the mem-
ber state at domestic prices. Where importation was in private hands,
import licensing controls were often employed to prevent imports in
amounts that might disturb domestic markets.25
(2) European agricultural economies are planned economies rather
than free market economies.
It was noted above that the mere elimination of tariffs can actu-
ally lead to distortions of trade where laws of member states of a cus-
toms union vary. Since the member states have a history of farm pro-
grams involving subsidies, price supports, minimum prices and other
measures, the problems caused by law-variations are more aggravated
in agriculture than they are in industry.2" If, for example, one member
state grants a production subsidy and others do not, the subsidized
producer may be able to undersell non-subsidized producers in other
member states even though the latter may be more efficient. On the
other hand, if a member state supports prices at a certain level by
agreeing to purchase all produce offered when the market price falls
below the support price level, the elimination of customs duites under-
mines that state's farm program when foreign produce is imported at a
price below the support price. Although these problems might be over-
come by approximating the farm programs of member states, the ap-
proximation of regulatory codes involves a good deal more than the
removal of disparities in a limited number of laws."
25 See Olmi, The Agricultural Policy of the Community, 1 C.M.L. Rxv. 118, 123
(1963) ; Megret, supra note 3, at 268. Most common market organizations which have
been used continue to use the device of the import license, but they are not used as the
primary regulators of international trade and will not be considered in this paper.
26 See generally TRACy, AGRIcULTURE iN WESTERmN EURoPE (1964). "All the mem-
ber states use governmental means to maintain the price level of agricultural products,
principally by tariffs and quotas, but also by other means of control such as fixed
prices, minimum prices or target prices which are supported by a government buying
agency." CAMPBELL & THoMxsoN, COMMON MA sxr LAv § 210 (1962).
27 See Guinther, Der Richtpreis als Agrarpolitisches Mittel zur Marktreguhierung,
23 EumoPmscHE WmRTscHAFT 587 (1961) : "[The] focus for agriculture in the EEC
Treaty is the regulated market and the focus for industry has become the unregulated
market."
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(3) The Treaty of Rome calls for a common agricultural policy in-
volving more than free trade.
Article 38 of the Treaty calls for the establishment of a common
agricultural policy whose goals, listed in article 39, include (a) in-
creased agricultural productivity, (b) fair standards of living for agri-
cultural workers, (c) stable markets, (d) adequate supplies and (e)
reasonable prices." If one believes that the mere creation of free intra-
community trade will by itself bring about these goals, one need not be
concerned about the content of member state farm programs, as long
as they are approximated. But if the attainment of these goals requires
more than free-trade, one must be concerned with the content of mem-
ber state laws as well as their harmonization. Common policy implies
a common legal content which, in turn, implies Community legisla-
tion.2"
III. THE PLACE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE TREATY OF ROME
The Treaty of Rome deals with the special problems of agriculture
by subjecting agriculture to the general rules of the Treaty and at the
same time creating specific exceptions"0 which either (1) are of a tem-
porary nature designed to cope with special problems created by the
agricultural economy or (2) allow the Community to supplant the
general scheme of the Treaty with separate "organizations" for certain
sectors of the agricultural economy. The temporary rules designed to
adjust agriculture to a customs union framework until specific agricul-
tural market organizations become effective are set forth in articles 44,
45 and 46 of the Treaty. The creation of common organizations of the
agricultural markets by means of Community legislation is authorized
in articles 40 and 43.1
28 In a resolution on the elaboration of a common agricultural policy, the European
Parliament stated that the common policy should take into account "the necessity to
compensate as much as possible, by appropriate economic and structural measures, for
the inherent difficulties which disfavor this sector in relation to the other branches of
the economy .. " J.O.C.E. 789/59. See also note 54 infra and accompanying text.
29 See Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying Draft Regulation Providing for
the Gradual Establishment of a Common Market Organization in the Grain Sector,
EEC Bulletin, July-Aug., 1961, pp. 116, 117; Address by Hallstein, reprinted partially
in EEC Bulletin, Nov., 1961, p. 14.
30 Exceptions apply to the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty. Treaty, art.
38(3). The list was modified on Dec. 18, 1959. See Megret, supra note 3, at 269.
21 Trade in agricultural products is also subject to the provisions of article 42 of the
Treaty, which provides that the competition rules of the Community (concerning
cartels, dominant enterprises, dumping and state aids) shall not apply to agriculture
except as laid down in the regulations establishing common organizations of the mar-
kets. To apply the Treaty's provisions prohibiting state aids would be to destroy many
national farm problems. The market organization regulations themselves meet this
problem by establishing aid programs on a Community-wide scale and prohibiting state
[ V OL. -40: :685
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1. Article 44-Minimum Prices. Article 44 provides that in cases
where the creation of a customs union might, during the transitional
period, jeopardize the goals set forth in article 39, a member state may
establish a system of minimum prices. Imports offered at prices below
the established minimum may be temporarily suspended or reduced; or
imported on condition that their price shall be higher than the minimum
price fixed for the product concerned. Accordingly, if a member state
government maintains its prices at a certain minimum level by buying
all produce offered to it at that level, it can prevent the undermining
effect of cheap imports from other member states by resorting to
article 44. While this by itself is inconsistent with the goals of a
customs union, article 44 provides that the Council shall determine
the criteria by which minimum prices are to be fixed in such a manner
that (a) a Community preference will develop and (b) prices will be
approximated within the Common Market by the end of the transi-
tional period. After prices are approximated, of course, minimum price
systems will create no obstacles to intra-community trade because
minimum prices of one member state will be no higher than the export
prices of another." If a state intends to apply the minimum price
system it must give prior notice to the Commission and other member
states and announce the minimum price level for each product. It
appears that, as a practical matter, resort to the minimum price system
may not be had unless the member state supports prices by means of
intervention purchases.33 If such a purchase system exists, the mini-
mum price may not exceed 105 per cent of the "intervention price. "
Also, the system may not be applied unless the average wholesale price
has been less than the minimum price for a period of three successive
aids not expressly authorized in the regulations. See, e.g., Council Reg. No. 19(19),
establishment of a common market organization for grain, J.O.C.E. 933/62, at 940.
Council Reg. No. 26, J.O.C.E. 993/62, as amended J.O.C.E. 1571/62 (translated in
1 CCH CommoN MKT. RE. 1 915) provides that except as provided in the market
organization regulations, the provisions of articles 85-90 (competition rules applicable
to private agreements and practices) apply to all decisions and practices except those
of national market organizations or to those necessary to achieve the goals of article
39.
32 Under a decision of the Council, a member state desiring to set minimum prices
must set them at least annually. J.O.C.E. 995/62. Translated in 1 CCII CoMoN MXT.
REP. ff 963. See Woelki, Mindestpreise im Genteinsamen Agrarmarkt, 5 EUMPAISCHE
WiRTSCrAFT 103 (1962).
33 If prices are not so supported, minimum prices may not be higher than 92% of
the mean prices for the three years preceding the period for which the minimum price
are set. Council Decision concerning minimum prices, J.O.C.E. 995/62, art. 6(2). How-
ever, article 4(4) of that decision provides that importation may not be suspended
unless the market price has been below the minimum price for three successive years.
It is difficult to see how the conditions of article 6(2) could be met in such circum-
stances.
34 Council Decision concerning minimum prices, J.O.C.E. 995/62, art. 6(l).
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years. 5 Thus, if a member state sets a 100 dollar intervention purchase
price for a given product, it may set the minimum price at 105 dollars.
If the average wholesale price has been less than 105 dollars for three
successive years, it may temporarily suspend or reduce imports of the
product unless the exporter charges 105 dollars or more. In order to
ensure a Community preference, minimum prices in respect to imports
from third countries must be higher than 105 dollars. This system may
be applied to intra-community trade only during the period of transition
to a customs union. It does not apply even during the transitional
period to those agricultural sectors (now constituting over eighty-five
per cent of the total agricultural production within the Community)
governed by separate "market organization" regulations. 6
2. Article 45-Long Term Contracts. Article 45 allows member
states having national market organizations in respect of a given prod-
uct to enter into long-term commodity agreements-voluntary arrange-
ments creating quotas and other restrictions upon trade, such as mini-
mum import prices" 7-with other member states. When national mar-
keting organizations are replaced by the "Community" organizations
discussed below, these agreements are to become ineffective. Thus far,
article 45 has given rise to only one agreement (regulating the ex-
change of grains between France and Germany and now superseded)."
However, if the provisions of article 45 are insignificant in their posi-
tive aspect, they have often been applied in their negative aspect.
Member states have used article 45 to justify maintaining quotas-
even in absence of article 45 agreements-until a Community market
organization for a given product comes into effect. They have argued
that free circulation of agricultural goods can take place only within
the framework of a "common organization" of markets, and that in
those markets for which no "common organization" exists, article 45
implies that the general rules of the Treaty, requiring the abolition of
quotas, do not apply to trade in agricultural products."5
3. Article 46-Countervailing Duties. Article 46 provides that where
35 See note 34, supra.
36 The market organization regulations prohibit recourse to article 44 in respect to
products covered by the regulations. Reg. No. 19(18) ; Reg. No. 20(14) ; Reg. No.
21(11) ; Reg. No. 22(11) ; Reg. No. 23(9) ; Reg. No. 13/64(12) ; Reg. No. 14/64(12) ;
Reg. No. 16/64(12). Full citations of these regulations may be found in notes accom-
panying textual descriptions of the regulations, infra.
37 See Walker, The International Law of Commodity Agreement, 28 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 392 (1963).
38 See EEC Bulletin, May, 1959, p. 43.
39 See Megret, supra note 3, at 272.
[VOL. 40 : 685
CRISIS IN THE COMMON MARKET
a product in an exporting member state is the subject of a national
marketing organization which affects the competitive position of a sim-
ilar product in an importing member state, the importing state may
impose a "countervailing duty" to remove the disparity caused by the
exporting state's market organization unless the exporting state itself
imposes a countervailing export duty.40 This means that if one member
state has a farm program for a given product involving a subsidy of,
for example, ten dollars,4 ' an importing member state may, in deroga-
tion of the general rules of the Treaty, impose an equal countervailing
duty unless the exporting state itself imposes an export duty in the
same amount.,2
4. Articles 40 and 43--Common Organizations of the Markets.
Articles 44, 45 and 46 are only stop-gap measures. Articles 45 and 46
are stated to apply only until national market organizations are re-
placed by common organizations. The common market organizations
that have been adopted have in fact also rendered article 44 inap-
plicable. There are good reasons why these measures should be only
temporary. While they may eliminate trade distortions otherwise cre-
ated by the general rules of customs unions, they do not bring about
the goal of economic integration. The countervailing duties authorized
in article 45, for example, may protect the efficient producer in one
member state against the artificial advantages of a producer in a second
member state, but they do not by themselves enable the efficient pro-
ducer to penetrate markets where inefficient producers are subsidized.
4 0 The commission, not the importing member state, sets the amount of the duty.
Treaty, art. 46. These duties are similar to those provided by section 303 of the Tariff
Act of 1933, authorizing countervailing duties to offset subsidies granted to exporters
of goods to the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1958).
41 Unless otherwise indicated, prices for Community agricultural produce will be
stated in terms of dollars. The Community itself expresses prices in terms of "units
of account," which are equal in value to the number of grams of fine gold now equal
in value to the U.S. dollar. National currencies of member states are convertible into
"units of account" at the parity declared before the International Monetary Fund, or
on the basis of quotations on official exchange markets. Reg. No. 129, concerning units
of account and rates of exchange applicable within the framework of the common
agricultural policy, J.O.C.E. 2553/62, translated in 1 CCH CoMmor MKT. REP. 111
925-29.42 The council has adopted a decision authorizing member states to impose counter-
vailing duties on processed products whose ingredients are not produced in the Com-
munity or are not included in a common market organization. The duty consists of one
element designed to protect processors (a maximum of 5% and subject to a 1%
annual reduction) and a second element designed to equalize differences in costs of
base products. As base product prices are equalized the second element of the duty is
to disappear. Council Decision authorizing the collection of a compensatory tax on
certain processed agricultural produce, J.O.C.E. 999/62. An example of a product
covered by this decision is tapioca made from potato starch. Potatoes as such are not
included in any common market organization. See Council Decision establishing a list
of goods to which compensatory taxes may be applied, J.O.C.E. 1000/62.
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Although article 44 looks to the eventual establishment of common
prices and a resultant freeing of trade, it is a neutral provision which
does not give the Community the tools to bring about the goals set
forth in article 39. Article 40 therefore authorizes the Community to
establish a "common organization for agricultural markets" which may
include "all measures required to achieve the objectives set out in
article 39."" These common organizations may take one or more of
the following forms:
(a) common rules of competition;
(b) compulsory co-ordination of national marketing
organizations; or
(c) a European marketing organization.
Article 40 also authorizes the creation of one or more "agricultural
guidance and guarantee funds" to assist in achieving the objectives
set out in article 39.
The term "market organization" is not defined in the Treaty. In the
recent case of EEC Comm'n v. Luxembourg and Belgium," however,
the Court of Justice of the European Communities had occasion to
consider the meaning of the term. Advocate General Roemer pointed
out that in the Spaak Report45 "a market organization is referred to as
the antithesis of free competition."" Somewhat more exactly, the
Court of Justice stated that "the organization of a market consists of
an aggregate of legal provisions and arrangements whereby the com-
petent authorities attempt to control and regulate the market. 47 A
"market organization" is therefore a "farm program" which trans-
forms agriculture into a regulated industry. 8 Although the Treaty
provides that these organizations may take the form of "common rules
concerning competition," it is doubtful that such rules by themselves
4 1 These measures may include price controls, subsidies, stocking and common
export-import stabilization arrangements. Treaty, art. 40(3). The provisions neces-
sarily imply the permissibility of derogations from the general rules of the Treaty.
See Megret, supra note 3, at 270.
44 10 RECEUIL 1217 (1964), translated in 2 CCH Co.-i.rON MKr. REP. 1 8028. (Sub-
sequent references herein are to the CCH translation.)
45 COMITE INTERG6UVERNMENTAL CREEL PAR LA CONFIERENCE DE MESSINE, RAPPORT
DES CHEFS DE DELEGATIONS AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES P-TRANOERES (1956).
4o EEC Comm'n v. Luxembourg & Belgium, 2 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 1 8028.
The EEC commission considered a market organization to be an aggregate of provi-
sions relating to trade in a product, designed to guarantee full employment and a fair
standard of living to producers. Ibid.
47 EEC Comm'n v. Luxembourg, 2 CCH CoMimoN MKT. REP. 8028.
48 Olmi has stated that the term "organization" is to be interpreted "in the sense of
'management by specialized organs'...." Olmi, 77he Agricultural Policy of the Com-
nuitv, 1 C.M.L. REv. 118, 143 (1963).
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constitute an "organization," because they involve no element of plan-
ning.4° They may be an adjunct of either a free-market or regulated
economy, but standing alone do not create either one. The backbone
of the market organizations is to be either a compulsory co-ordination
of national market organizations or the substitution of national or-
ganizations by Community organizations. In practice, the Community
has adopted the latter approach. 0 Since market organizations consist
of "an aggregate of legal provisions.., to control and regulate the
market," a "common" market organization involves Community rather
than national laws and regulations.
Common organizations for Community agricultural markets have
been adopted on a product-by-product basis, each organization modi-
fied to meet the particular needs of the product involved. But what-
ever form the various common organizations may take, they are
nevertheless all designed (a) to bring about free trade and the condi-
tions of one internal market by the end of the transitional period (or
before, if possible), and (b) to bring about the common policy objec-
tives of article 39; i.e., increased productivity, improved living stand-
ards, stable markets, guaranteed supplies and reasonable consumer
prices. What is unique about agriculture is that the transition to a
"common market" must take place within the framework of planned
economies, regulated separately at first by the six member states and
finally by the Community under the aegis of one common plan.
IV. MARKET ORGANIZATIONS BY SECTOR
A. General Development of the Plans
1. Chronology. Under the procedure of article 43 for the develop-
ment of common organizations of the market, the Commission was
first to convene a conference of representatives from member states to
compare respective national agricultural policies, resources and needs."
49See Conclusions of Advocate General Roemer in EEC Comm'n v. Belgium &
Luxembourg, 2 CCH CoomON MxT. REP. 7434.
60 See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying Draft Regulation Providing
for the Gradual Establishment of a Common Market Organization of the Grain
Sector, EEC Bulletin, July-Aug., 1961, p. 116, where the commission stated that "[It]
cannot be expected that the aims which a common grain policy must pursue can be
attained by mere co-ordination of the various national markets and application of the
common rules of competition."
r1 A consideration of resources, capabilities and needs of member states is beyond
the scope of this paper. A discussion of the relative yields per acre, yields per man,
usage habits, surpluses and needs of the member states as of January 1, 1958, is con-
tained in Thiede, Die Versorgung der EWG Ldnder init Lanzdwirtschaftlichen Erzev-
gnissen vor Begim; des Gentehnsarnen Marktes, 1964 STATISISCHE INFOPMATIoNEN
No. 1, at 5-65. It has been estimated that in "the most important agricultural prod-
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Thereafter (by January 1, 1960) the Commission was to make pro-
posals for putting the common agricultural policy into effect. On the
basis of these proposals the Council was to adopt "regulations or
directives, or take decisions" designed to create the common organi-
zations.
2. Conference of Stresa. The conference of representatives from
member states was held in Stress, Italy, from July 3 to July 11, 1958.
The conferees concluded that in all member states the productivity of
agricultural labor had increased, but because increases in production
had exceeded increases in demand, agricultural revenues had declined
per worker even though the active agricultural population was dimin-
ishing. Measures designed to increase agricultural incomes (such as
price supports and subsidies) had led to increases in production and
were often self-defeating. A resolution adopted by the conferees ex-
pressed a consensus on the following matters:52
(a) Agriculture must be considered an essential element of the
economy. (This apparently means that European agriculture is to be
maintained even if it is relatively inefficient by comparison to world
markets.)
(b) The common agricultural policy should lead to increased
Community trade, but international commitments (e.g., within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) should be respected and
domestic producers should be protected against abnormal competition.
(c) The common agricultural policy should lead to "structural
adaptation" and an optimum utilization of factors of production within
the Community.
(d) Equilibrium between supply and demand should be sought.
(e) A price policy should be designed to avoid surpluses and
and permit enterprises to become or remain competitive.
(f) Subsidies contrary to the spirit of the Treaty should be
eliminated.
Following this conference, the Commission prepared (and submitted
ucts" the Community is self-sufficient to the extent of 90%. Most significant imports
consist of citrus fruits, tobacco, feed grains and bread grains. There are surpluses of
sugar, vegetables and some processed meat products. The Community nevertheless
takes in a third of all exports of agricultural products on the world market. Keller,
Die Agrarpolitische Beschliisse der EWG, 14 WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT 114 (1962).
See also DOCUIENT DE TRAVAILLE SUR LA SITUATION DE L'AGRICULTURE DANS LA
COMMUNAUTL (1958).
52 J.O.C.E. 281/58.
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to the Council on June 30, 196011) the "Mansholt Plan" for the reg-
ulation of Community agriculture. Its proposals were the basis of
regulations adopted by the Council on April 4, 1962, relating to the
financing of the common agricultural policy and creating separate
market organizations for the sectors of grain, pork, eggs, poultry, fruit
and vegetables, and vine products. Between April 1962 and December
1963 these organizations were put into effect by means of over one
hundred "supplementing" regulations and decisions of the Council
and of the Commission. On February 5, 1964, the Council adopted
additional regulations establishing market organizations for the sectors
of rice, beef, and milk and dairy products."' These have also been
elaborated by supplementing regulations. On December 15, 1964, the
Council adopted important decisions calling for a common level of
grain prices (and thus a common market for grain products) within
the Common Market by July 1967. Finally, on March 31, 1965, the
Commission submitted proposals to the Council calling for (a) the
complete financing of certain aspects of the common policy by the
Community rather than by member states, (b) the assignment to the
Community of funds collected by states from customs duties and levies
imposed on imports from third countries, and (c) an amendment to
the Treaty designed to give a measure of budgetary control to the
European Parliament."
3. Legal Basis of the Plans. Most of the common organizations of
the markets are based upon "fundamental" regulations adopted by the
Council of Ministers of the Community and "supplemental" regula-
tions issued variously by the Council and the Commission. Although a
regulation is a Community law,5" it is difficult to find counterparts to
the Common Market legislative process in American institutions. If
the Treaty of Rome is viewed as a type of "constitution," the Council
of Ministers may be considered the legislative body and regulations
may be considered the equivalent of statutes. If, on the other hand,
the Treaty is considered a type of supranational administrative law,
the Council may be considered the administrative body to which a
rule-making power has been delegated." Neither analogy is entirely
53 EEC Bulletin, June, July, 1960, pp. 38-45.
54 Common organizations of the markets for fats and oils, sugar, fresh milk, fish,
ethyl alcohol, and non-edible horticultural products were also planned. See Megret,
Principes Di Regitiw Applicable A L'Agriculture Dans Le Marche Commun, 7 RIvui-
Du MARCHP, Coansux 267, 274 (1964).
5 See text accompanying notes 213-23 infra.
56 See note 62 infra.
57 See G6tz, Europliisches Getreideprcisrccht, 18 JURISTENZEITUNG 157 (1963).
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accurate. First, the Treaty of Rome is more than a mere organiza-
tional treaty, and consequently more specific in its statement of policy
than a constitution would be. Second, the Council is not a true legis-
lative body because it is not responsible to a Community electorate.
As in the case of an administrative law generally, control resides in
requirement that regulations conform to the underlying statute (or in
this case, Treaty); rule-makers are subject to judicial, rather than
popular, control." On the other hand, the scope of the rule-makers'
discretion is probably greater than would be allowed in federal admin-
istrative law in the United States.59 Moreover, the regulations adopted
by the Council of Ministers supersede, in their scope of application,
laws passed by parliaments of member states.6" This has not created
political problems in the Common Market because significant regula-
tions now require the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers.
But beginning on January 1, 1966 (the beginning of the third stage of
the transitional period), resolutions establishing market organizations
can be adopted by a qualified majority of the Council, 1 and will be
binding upon the dissenting member states and their parliaments.
However categorized, these regulations have the force of law within
the Community and are directly binding upon governments, enterprises
and individuals. 2
58 See BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 34-36 (1962).
59 The scope of discretion granted to the council in the area of agriculture is almost
as broad in scope as the power delegated in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which was held unconstitutional. It has been
stated that "the Schechter case involved excessive delegation of the kind Congress is
not likely to make again." 1 DAvis, ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 201 (1938). A
former member of the European Court of Justice describes the power to issue regula-
tions as a power sui generis, denying that the power of the council is a law-making
power. See CATALANO, MANUEL DE DES DROIT COMMUNAUTES EUROPE]ENNES 108-12
(1962). However, if the term "law" is judged in terms of its effect, it seems difficult
to deny that status to regulations which can supersede national statutes. The Court of
Justice has referred to the power of the High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community to render "general decisions" as a "quasi-legislative" power. Nold
v. High Authority of the ECSC, 5 RECEUIL 95, 113 (1958).
60 This is implied in Treaty, art. 43 (3) which authorizes the council, under certain
conditions, to substitute common market organizations for national market organiza-
tions even over the objection of the member state whose national organization is
affected. See also Costa v. ENEL, 10 RECEUIL 1141 (1964), where the Court of
Justice ruled that the Treaty supersedes national laws and even deprives member states
of law-making powers in areas covered by the Treaty.
61 Treaty, art. 43(2). For voting purposes, France, Germany and Italy are each
given four votes, while two are allocated to each of Belgium and the Netherlands and
one to Luxembourg. Where voting is by qualified majority, twelve votes are required.
If the voting is not pursuant to a proposal of the commission, these twelve votes (or
more) must include the affirmative votes of at least three member states. Treaty, art.
148.
62 Where specifically authorized, the council or the commission may issue regula-
tions, directives, decisions and recommendations. Recommendations have no binding
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4. General Nature of the Plans. If one disregards those agricultural
market organizations which are based on a customs union framework,
it can be said generally that each market organization involves, sep-
arately or conjunctively, a levy system or a price system. A levy sys-
tem is designed to protect the domestic price level against cheaper
imports from abroad; a price system is designed to maintain the do-
mestic price at a stated level by means of government price supports or
"interventions." The levy system can operate independently of the
price system but the two systems are often used in conjunction with
each other. Where the levy system applies, an import tax or "levy"
equal to the difference between the domestic price level (whether or not
supported) and the price of the imported product is imposed on im-
ports. Since both the domestic and foreign prices vary, the levy is
"variable -- to guarantee that the imported product will not be sold at
a price below the domestic price level. The price system usually in-
volves the setting of a "target price" by each member state. This price
-a price which the state intends shall prevail on the wholesale market
-is maintained within the state by its commitment to purchase any
goods offered to it at a predetermined price slightly below the target
price level. The levy system can work in conjunction with the price
system by setting the levy at an amount roughly equal to the difference
between the local target price and the import price. Free trade within
the Community can then be accomplished by gradually approximating
the various target prices of the member states. A "Community prefer-
ence" can be maintained by setting the levy in respect of imports from
third countries at an amount which slightly exceeds the difference be-
tween the import price and the domestic market price or target price
(or alternatively, by setting the intra-community levy at a level which
permits imports at a price slightly lower than the domestic target
price) ."
The general operation of both the price system and the levy system
is best illustrated by the common market organization for grain. Mar-
ket organizations for other sectors will also be considered to the extent
effect. Decisions are binding upon those persons to whom they are addressed. Direc-
tives are commands to member states to take action to effect some goal, allowing the
member state discretion as to means and procedures. Regulations "shall have general
application. They shall be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each
Member State." Treaty, art. 189. Regulations are to be published in the Official
Gazette and become effective when stated in the regulation or, failing such specifica-
tion, on the twentieth day following their publication. Treaty, art. 191.
63 See generally Council Resolution on principles to be taken as the basis of a levy
system for products to be decided on later. EEC Bulletin, Jan., 1961, pp. 8, 1-82.
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that their general application differs from the market organization for
grain.
B. Market Organization for Grain-Regulation No. 1964
Council Regulation No. 19 creates a market organization for (i)
most food and feed grains produced in the Common Market, (ii) flours
and other "simple processed products," and (iii) other grain products
subject to a higher degree of processing, such as starch, malt, glucose
and bran.65 A consideration of the regulation requires a prior definition
of certain terms of art.
(a) Target Price. This is the price level intended for a product at
the wholesale stage in the "area of greatest deficit"66 within the area
for which the target price is fixed. This is not a "set" price in the
sense that it is a price imposed by government fiat. However, levies on
imports, and government "intervention" purchases of domestic grain
are designed so that the target price will approximate the actual whole-
sale price in the area of greatest deficit. Wholesale prices in areas other
than that of greatest deficit will normally be somewhat lower, due to
natural market conditions.
(b) Intervention Price. This is a price between five and ten per
cent lower than the target price. As to grains for which target prices
are fixed, government intervention agencies are required to purchase
any grain offered to them at the intervention price set for that grain
and may not re-sell products so purchased at a price which would tend
to bring the wholesale price level below the target price.68
(c) Threshold Price."5 This is a price, set for one given "border
64 Council Reg. No. 19, establishment of a common market organization for grain,
J.O.C.E. 933/62, amended by Council Reg. No. 49 to change effective date from July
1, 1962 to July 30, 1962 (translated with amendments in 1 CCH CoNIMON MKT. REP.
f[ 428) (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 19).65 Reg. No. 19(1).
66 See note 76 infra.
67 Reg. No. 19(5). The price is to be set annually before the winter sowing. Prices
per product depend upon the quality of the product. One base price is set for a grade
of standard quality. Derived prices for different quality grades are then based on
comparison coefficients. Commission Reg. No. 61, setting quality standards for grain
as well as coefficients of equivalence between these standards and quality standards set
for national target prices, J.O.C.E. 1671/62. "Derived" target prices for areas other
than the area of greatest deficit may be set at levels lower than the basic target price.
See note 76 infra.
68 Reg. No. 19(7). "Derived" intervention prices for areas other than the area of
greatest deficit may also be set where derived target prices have been established. In
these cases derived intervention prices can be set at a level somewhat higher than 95%
of the derived target price. Reg. No. 19(7), para. 2.69 Reg. No. 19(4), (8).
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crossing point,"7 which an importer should pay (including the levy
imposed on the imported product) in order to be able to sell the prod-
uct in the area of greatest deficit at the target price (or its equivalent
in cases where no target prices have been set) on the wholesale market
(after taking into account freight costs and the "standard amount"
described below).
(d) Free-to-Frontier Price.71 This is the price, set by the Common
Market Commission, at which an exporter from one member state is
presumed to be able to put a product at a stated "border crossing
point" of another member state. This is a set price based on actual
market prices in the exporting state, adjusted to reflect reasonable
freight costs up to the border crossing point designated by the importing
member state. These are actually fictitious prices used to calculate the
amount of levies, but are designed to approximate an importer's actual
costs."
(e) C.i.f. Price.5 This price is similar to the free-to-frontier price
for a given product except that it applies to imports into the Commu-
nity from third countries. It is based on the most favorable price, in-
cluding insurance and freight, at which a given member state may
import goods from the world market to the border crossing point.
Since this is the "most favorable price," it applies to all imports from
third countries, regardless of the country of origin. 4
7o Border crossing points of member states are listed in the annex to Commission
Reg. No. 37/65, J.O.C.E. 725/65. They are Anvers, Belgium; Emmerich, Germany;
Marseilles, France (Dunkirk for maize and sorghum) ; Sterpenich, Luxembourg; and
Palermo, Italy (Genoa for hard wheat and hard wheat products), and Rotterdam, the
Netherlands. Megret, Principes Du Regime Applicable a L'Agriculture Dans Le
March Conmmun, 7 REVUE DU MARCHA ComxON 267, 283 (1964) defines the threshold
price as "the base target price transposed from the area of greatest deficit to the
import point selected by the Member State, taking into account freight costs from
this import point to the area of greatest deficit." This would not seem to be entirely
accurate if the threshold price also takes into consideration the "standard amount."
See note 97, infra. If, for example, the import point and the area of greatest deficit
were identical, it would seem that the threshold price should be somewhat higher than
the target price.71 Reg. No. 19(3).
72 Commission Reg. No. 89, J.O.C.E. 1899/62, as modified by Commission Reg. No.
132/63, J.O.C.E. 3005/63, set criteria for fixing free-to-frontier prices. They are
based on "most favorable purchase possibilities" in the exporting member state. These
prices are set weekly by the commission on the basis of information furnished by
member states as to actual market prices. To these prices are added the lowest avail-
able transport costs to the border crossing point of the importing member state. Ibid.
73 Reg. No. 19(10).
74 See Commission Reg. No. 37/65, concerning criteria for the setting of c.i.f. prices,
J.O.C.E. 725/65 (abrogating Commission Reg. No. 68, J.O.C.E. 1861/62). "Most
favorable prices" are based upon representative offers on the world market. Where
there are no such offers for a given product, prices are fixed on the basis of offers for
other products by means of equalizing coefficients.
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1. The Price System. Although Regulation No. 19 covers almost all
feed and food grains, target prices are to be set only for four grains-
wheat, barley and, in member states having a significant output, maize
and rye.7" Each member state is to set its own target price annually
within maximum and minimum limits set by the Council. 6 The maxi-
mum and minimum limits for wheat, barley and rye for the 1962-1963
marketing year were to be (a) as a maximum, no more than seven and
one-half per cent higher than the 1962-1963 guaranteed minimum pro-
ducer price in the area of greatest deficit in the member state having
the largest imports of the product, and (b) as a minimum, at least five
per cent higher than the guaranteed minimum producer price in the
area of greatest surplus of the member state having the most exports of
the product in question. This may be illustrated by the following
example:
Assume that the member states having the largest exports and im-
ports of wheat are France and Germany, respectively. Assume that
(i) the area of greatest surplus in France is Nancy, with a 1961-1962
minimum guarantee producer price of 95 dollars per metric ton;
and (ii) the area of greatest deficit in Germany is Duisburg, with a
1961-1962 minimum guaranteed producer price of 120 dollars per
metric ton. The upper limit for target prices for 1962-1963 under
these assumed facts would be 120 dollars increased by seven and one-
half per cent, or 129 dollars. The lower limit for the same year would
be 95 dollars increased by five per cent, or 99.75 dollars. Each member
state, under these facts, would have been able to set national target
prices at any point between these two levels.78
The mere setting of a target price by a member state is no more than
the expression of a goal. The price must be assured internally by some
form of guarantee. This is done by means of government purchases of
75 Reg. No. 19(5).
76 Ibid. As noted above the basic national target price is to be set for the "area of
greatest deficit" within the member state. In an unregulated market, prices in such
areas would naturally be higher than prices in surplus areas, because the consumer
price would have to include costs of transport from surplus areas to the deficit area.
Where the price differential due to this factor exceeds 5% of the wholesale price,
derived target prices for other areas may be set "according to the price differences
due to natural conditions in the formation of prices." Reg. No. 19(5), para. 2.
7T The council sets only the lower limits of the target price level for maize, set for
1962-1963 at the lowest 1961-1962 market price. Reg. No. 19(6). During the transi-
tional period the difference between these two extremes is to be reduced to zero. Reg.
No. 19(6), para. 4.
78The actual maximum and minimum target prices for wheat for the 1962-1963
year were set at $118.92 and $89.43, respectively. See Council Decision setting maxi-
mum and minimum grain target prices for the 1962-1963 marketing year, J.O.C.E.
1280/62. The same prices were set for 1963-1964, despite the aim of gradually reduc-
ing the difference. See Council Reg. No. 48/63, concerning measures to apply in the
domain of grain prices for the 1963-1964 marketing year, J.O.C.E. 1777/63.
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wheat, barley, rye and corn offered at the so-called intervention price.
This price is the target price less an amount between a minimum of five
per cent and a maximum of ten per cent of the target price, as the
member state involved may decide."9
Assume that in the above example Germany sets its target price for
wheat at the maximum (129 dollars per metric ton) and France sets
its price at the minimum (99.75 dollars per metric ton) for the 1962-
1963 marketing year. Assume that each sets the intervention price at
the target price less ten per cent. This means that the basic interven-
tion prices on the assumed facts would be 116.10 dollars and 89.77
dollars.80
Government purchases of grains from producers will lead to a guaran-
teed producer price at the intervention price level. Since the target
price is a wholesale market price, costs of getting grain to the wholesale
market stage, added to the intervention price, should add up to a price
close to the target price. Since target prices are set only for the area
of greatest deficit in each member state and because market prices in
other areas should be somewhat lower due to natural market conditions,
intervention prices should also be somewhat lower in those other areas.
For this reason, member states are allowed, under certain conditions, to
set "derived intervention prices" at somewhat lower levels for areas
other than the area of greatest deficit.82
Although the price system applies only to four "basic" grains, it is
nevertheless reasonable to assume that supported target prices for basic
grains will influence the actual prices of all other grains and processed
products as well. Wheat flour, for example, will necessarily reflect the
target price of wheat grain. Target prices for basic grains will also
affect the market prices of other grains, but in a less direct manner. If
fareg. No. 19(7). See nate 68 stepra. The target price is to be set in advance oftefrig year and adjusted monthly for at least five and not more than ten months
of the marketing season, to take account of storage and interest costs. Thus target(and intervention) prices will be lowest in the month of harvest and will be highest
5-10 months thereafter. This encourages producers and wholesalers not to glut the
market or intervention agencies by sales in the month of harvest. Domestic producers
with unused storage space will thus find it advantageous to hold their grain until the
target price is highest. Reg. No. 19(5), para. (3). See Gitz, supra note 57, at 159.
Third country exporters might also find an advantage in this, because threshold prices
do not rise monthly as do the target prices. Moreover, the fact that cif. prices prob-
ably reflect storage costs gives the exporter a double advantage: (1) the price he gets
is higher; and (2) the difference between the threshold price and the target price is
greater.
80 Products purchased at intervention prices may not be resold in such a manner as
to bring the market price below the target price. Reg. No. 19(7).81 But see note 76 supra.
82See note 76 supra. Since intervention prices are keyed to target prices, derived
target prices lead to derived intervention prices.
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a target price exists for wheat but not for buckwheat, the producer's
choice of production will be based (among other factors) upon the
target price level of wheat. If that level is high, he will be inclined to
grow more wheat and less buckwheat. Reduced production of buck-
wheat should then cause the price of buckwheat to rise. Thus, high
target prices will raise prices generally and low target prices should
have the opposite effect. The application may not be as exact as the
theory, however. A high target price for wheat could, for example, lead
to a surplus of wheat and shortage of buckwheat. The setting of target
prices for basic grains should therefore take into consideration tradi-
tional price relationships between grains."
2. The Levy System. The price system does not by itself protect the
domestic price level against the effect of cheap imports. Allowing im-
ports of wheat into a member state at a price lower than the target
price would depress the overall wholesale price level, and necessitate
increased intervention purchases by the member state.8 Protection
against cheaper imports is afforded by means of the levy system under
which a variable levy, approximately equal to the difference between
the import price and the domestic market price,85 is imposed on im-
ports. A community preference is created within the Common Market
by adding an additional "standard amount" to this levy in respect of
imports from third countries. Mechanisms used in applying the levy
system include "threshold" prices, "free-to-frontier" prices, "c.i.f."
prices, the "variable levy" and the "standard amount."
In applying the levy system, grains and grain products are divided
into three categories-(a) grains, (b) simple processed products, such
as flours, groats and semolinas and (c) complex processed products,
such as starches, brans and glucose, which require more processing
than simple milling.86 Threshold prices are established in each member
83 Conversely, threshold prices for non-target price grains must be set at such a
level that market prices for target price grains will equal the target prices. Reg. No.
19(8).
84 Recourse to the minimum price system authorized by Treaty, art. 44, could pre-
vent this result. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text. Resort to the levy
system makes article 44 unnecessary (and unavailable). See note 36 supra.
85 Since the variable levy system applies to intra-community trade during the tran-
sitional period, its application could result in higher import charges than were applied
on January 1, 1958. It has been questioned whether the intra-community levies are
consistent with the "standstill" provisions of article 12 of the Treaty if they lead to
higher charges on intra-community trade than were in effect on January 1, 1958.
Compare Gi~tz, supra note 57, at 157 with Olmi, The Agricultural Policy of the Com-
mnunity, 1 C.M.L. REv. 118, 133 (1963).
86 Reg. No. 19(1). Durum wheat is placed in a special category. See note 99 infra.
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state for all grains and simple processed products." As noted above,
the threshold prices for basic grains for which target prices have been
set are prices for a given port of entry into one member state set at such
a level that the eventual wholesale sales price of the imported product,
after (a) considering freight costs to the area of greatest deficit within
the importing state and (b) deducting the standard amount, will be
equal to the target price."8 Threshold prices are also set for those prod-
ucts for which no target prices exist (grains other than wheat, barley,
maize and rye, and all simple processed products).89 Although target
prices are not set for these other items, their actual market prices are
indirectly supported by the price system applicable to target price
products." If the levy system did not apply to these related products,
their prices, as well as the price system for target price products, would
be undermined. If non-target price grains could be imported duty-free
at abnormally low prices, local farmers would tend to concentrate on
production of grains for which target prices and intervention measures
exist, creating surpluses.91 Therefore the threshold prices for non-
target price grains are set at a level bearing a proper relationship to
threshold prices for which target prices have been fixed.92 Threshold
prices for simple processed products are set at such a level that they
(a) reflect the threshold prices of the grains which are their compo-
nents and (b) offer a certain amount of protection to the processing
industry." After the threshold prices for products are computed, a
levy is imposed which (a) in respect to imports from third countries is
set at a level equal to the difference between the c.i.f. price and the
threshold price and (b) in respect to imports from member states is set
at a level equal to the difference between the threshold price and the
87 Reg. No. 19(4), (8). See note 70 supra and accompanying text.8
s Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 See text accompanying note 83 sutpra.01 This would also leave producers of non-target price grains without protection
against cheap imports. Consumers would tend to purchase more of the non-target
price imported grains and less grains for which target prices exist. Although the price
system can be effective when limited to "basic products," the levy system clearly can-
not. The levy system has also been made applicable to grain mixtures. See Council
Reg. No. 139, J.O.C.E. 2729/62.
92 See Reg. No. 19(8). This can be done by basing threshold prices on traditional
price ratios. If the traditional price ratio of oats and barley is 90:100 the threshold
price for oats will be 90% of the threshold price for barley. See Resolution of
Member State Governments concerning the harmonization of grain threshold prices,
J.O.C.E. 1536/64.
93 Reg. No. 19(8); Council Reg. No. 37 concerning criteria for the setting of
threshold prices for certain flours, etc., J.O.C.E. 1553/62, as amended, J.O.C.E.
2737/63.
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free-to-frontier price of the imported product, less a standard amount
designed to give a preference to imports from member states.9" Since
(a) the c.i.f. price is based upon most favorable world prices and (b)
the free-to-frontier price is based upon actual prices in an exporting
member state, exporting member states are given a preference over
third country exporters who can sell for less than the threshold price
but not at the cheapest world market prices:
In the above example showing respective target prices for wheat in
Germany and France of 129 dollars and 99.75 dollars per metric ton,
assume that freight costs from the German border crossing point to the
German area of greatest deficit are 6 dollars and that the "standard
amount" deducted from the levy on imports from member states is 2
dollars. The standard amount in effect reduces the importer's freight
costs to 4 dollars. If the threshold price plus freight costs (as reduced
by the "standard amount" discount) are to equal the target price, it
can be assumed that the German threshold price is set at 125 dollars.
Assume that the c.i.f. price is set at 60 dollars, based upon the most
favorable purchase possibilities on the world market, and that United
States producers can deliver wheat to the German port of entry for 70
dollars. The levy imposed in respect of the import from the United
States would be 65 dollars per metric ton (the threshold price less
the c.i.f. price) even though this exceeds by 10 dollars the difference
between the actual import price and the threshold price. Assume that
the free-to-frontier price of French imports is 100 dollars. The levy
imposed on the French import will only be 25 dollars. If the free-to-
frontier price in respect of imports from Italy is 110 dollars, the levy
imposed on the import from Italy would be 15 dollars. Even if one
disregards the effect of the "standard amount" discounted from the
levy on member-state imports, the United States cannot compete with
France and Italy. Only the most efficient world producer-the one
who can put the wheat at the German port for 60 dollars per ton--can
compete.
The levy imposed on imports from third countries is the same no mat-
ter how efficient the exporter may be. In respect to intra-community
94 Reg. No. 19(2). The levy on imports from third countries is equal to the differ-
ence between the threshold price and the c.i.f. price set for the day of importation.
Thus, if an importer agrees on January 1 to purchase one ton of wheat at $70 for
March delivery, the levy will be based on the March c.i.f. price rather than the Janu-
ary 1 c.i.f. price. If the threshold price is $100 and the January 1 c.i.f. price is $70,
the levy on January 1 is $30. But if the c.i.f. price falls to $50 by March 1, the levy
would be $50. The contract purchaser importer in such event would pay a total of
$120 to get wheat into the country. To prevent this possibility, a contract-purchase
importer inay pay the levy applicable on the day he applies for the import license. If
the contract price is less than the c.i.f. price on day of application for the license, the
importer must pay a premium equal to the difference. See Reg. No. 19(7) ; Council
Reg. No. 54 concerning criteria for setting scale of premiums for imports of grains
from third countries, J.O.C.E. 1581/62.
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trade, however, less efficient producers are subjected to smaller levies."5
Community producers receive a second advantage by means of the
"standard amount" deducted from the levy on imports from other mem-
ber states. "
In the above example (German target price of 129 dollars; free-to-
frontier price for imports from France of 100 dollars; German thresh-
old price of 125 dollars; and a "standard amount" discount of 2 dollars)
a German importer would have to pay a levy of only 23 dollars in
respect to imports from France (25 dollars less the "standard amount"
discount of 2 dollars), resulting in a total import price of only 123
dollars. Even if the German importer can actually purchase wheat on
the world market at the designated c.i.f. price (60 dollars), the pay-
ment of the levy will result in a total import price for imports from the
world market of 125 dollars.
As noted above, the threshold price is set at such a level that the actual
wholesale price, taking into account the standard amount and freight
costs, will achieve the target price in the area of greatest deficit in the
importing member state. Since the standard amount is not deducted
from the levy on imports from third countries, such imports should
actually sell at a price slightly higher than the target price in the area
of greatest deficit in the importing member state. "7
As to complex processed products, the system is similar, but the levy
95 Even those Community producers who cannot sell at the threshold price or below
may be able to compete with third countries. The exporting member state may (butis not required to) refund to its producers in respect to intra-community trade an
amount equal to the difference between the threshold price of the importing member
state and the export price. In such cases, however, the "standard amount" discount is
not allowed. Reg. No. 19(19) (2) (b), (c).08 Actual standard amounts set in 1962 were one dollar per metric ton for grains
and flours and $2.50 per metric ton for complex processed products. Commission Reg.
No. 69, setting standard amounts for grains, flours, etc., J.O.C.E. 1863/62. For the
1963-1964 year the amount for grains and flours was raised to $1.10 and the amount
for complex processed products was raised to $5 per metric ton. Commission Reg. No.
58/63, setting standard amounts for grains, flours, etc., for the 1963-1964 marketing
year, J.O.C.E. 1801/63. For 1964-1965 and 1965-1966 the standard amounts for grains
and flours remained at $1.10, but the amount for complex processed products was
raised to $10 per metric ton.
07This may be a slight oversimplification, since the assumption that the standard
amount will enable the member state exporter to sell at the target price in the im-
porting member state is not always true. The amount may not be sufficient to bring
the price of the import down to the target price level, or it may enable the exporter to
sell for less than the target price level. Standard amounts are to be set so that "ex-
changes between Member States develop in a gradual and regular fashion until the
establishment of the single market.' Council Reg. No. 48, relating to criteria for the
setting of standard amounts for certain categories of grains, flours, etc,. J.O.C.E.
1570/62. This implies that standard amounts should increase gradually. (And in fact
they have. See note 96 supra.) See note 70 supra. It would seem, however, that the
prime stimulus to increased intra-community trade would be the approximation of
prices and that the principal purpose of the standard amount is merely to give Com-
munity producers an advantage over third countries.
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consists of two components. The first component of the levy is based
upon levies applicable to the products going into the complex processed
product.98 The second component is a fixed amount computed by
taking into account the necessity of protecting domestic processing
industries."
3. Creation of a Single Market. The levy system by itself serves as
an almost absolute bar to imports by a member state from any third
country unless and until there is an absolute deficit of a given product
within the entire Community, first because the levy is variable (i.e.,
the lower the world market price the greater the levy), and second,
because imports from other member states receive a preference. But
the price and levy systems do not by themselves bring about the crea-
tion of a single market within the Community. The single market is to
be brought about by gradually (a) approximating the target prices of
the member states... and (b) eliminating that part of intra-community
levies on processed products designed to protect processing indus-
tries.' Gradual approximation of target prices will lead to equaliza-
tion of market prices within the Community, and since levies are based
upon differences in market prices, the disappearance of market price
differentials will lead to an automatic disappearance of levies. One
trading area will be established by treating the entire Community as
one unit: One basic Community target price is to be established for
91 Reg. No. 19(14). If goods used in the processed products are not subject to the
levy system (e.g., sago, manioc), but can be used as substitutes for grains, the levy is
designed to maintain prices for the grains for which ingredients are substitutes. Ibid.
09Ibid. Reg. No. 19(10) contains special provisions for durum wheat. The special
provisions were adopted because the Community is a net importer of durum wheat and
because Community durum wheat production is centered in southern Italy, which
cannot compete with the world market. Raising threshold prices to enable Italian
producers to undersell world market producers is expensive for non-producing member
states in that it raises consumer prices. Therefore, the goal in the durum wheat mar-
ket is to keep threshold prices of non-producing member states relatively low. Italian
farmers are to be compensated by subsidies as much as by high support prices, because
subsidies do not have the effect of raising consumer prices. Producing member states
are also authorized to grant export refunds in respect of intra-community trade. The
refunds may be made in such an amount that Italian producers getting the refund will
have an advantage over world market suppliers. Reg. No. 19(10). The common grain
price decisions of December 15, 1964 carry forward these same principles. The com-
mon target price is to be $125 per metric ton but the producer price is to be $145. The
difference is to be given to the producer in the form of a subsidy. See The Decisions
of 15 December 1964, in EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, p. 15. Special provisions also apply
to rice, which is the subject of a separate market organization. Council Reg. No. 16/64
establishing a common market organization for rice, J.O.C.E. 574/64 (hereinafter
cited as Reg. No. 16/64). Rice is produced only in Italy and France. Reg. No. 16/64
therefore creates one single market for the non-producing member states and separate
markets for the two producing member states. Markets will be coalesced, but the co-
alescence will involve three markets rather than six.
100 Reg. No. 19(13).
101 Reg. No. 19(14) (1) (B).
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the one area of greatest deficit in the Community; one basic threshold
price and one basic c.i.f. price for each product will be established for
one Community port of entry; and one set of intervention prices and
derived intervention prices will be established.'
4. Establishment of Common Grain Prices. Regulation No. 19 pro-
vided that the single market stage should be achieved no later than
December 31, 1969, by means of gradually reducing to zero the differ-
ence between the maximum and minimum allowable national target
prices. On December 15, 1964, the Council, agreeing to the establish-
ment of a single price system by July 1, 1967 (two and one-half years
before the deadline), set the level of basic target prices to be effective
as of that time.' The 1967-1968 common price for wheat will be
about 106 dollars per metric ton,... compared to minimum and maxi-
mum target prices of approximately 90 dollars and 119 dollars respec-
tively in 1964-1965. This approximation of prices will lead to higher
price levels in low-cost member states and lower price levels in high-
cost member states. For example, a high-cost producer of wheat, such
as Germany, has tended to set its target prices at a high level in order
102 Reg. No. 19(13).10 See generally The Decision.s of 15 December 1964 EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, pp.
8-19; Les Accords du 15 Decembre 1964, 8 REvuE DU MARCHE COMMUN 9 (1965).
These important decisions, which have not yet taken the form of regulations, have not
yet been published in the JouRNAL OFFICIEL. See response to written question no. 127
of M. Vredeling, J.O.C.E. 2457/65.
104 The adjustments that must be made are illustrated in the following comparison
of 1964-1965 maximum and minimum target price and the 1967-1968 common prices(per metric ton, rounded to the nearest dollar) :
1964-1965 1967-1968
Maximum Minimum Common Price
Soft Wheat 119 90 106
Barley 103 72 91
Maize - 63 91
Rye 108 68 91
Durum Wheat - - 125
Basic intervention prices of $98.75 for wheat, $117.50 for duruin wheat, $85 for barley
and $87.50 for rye were set. All these prices may be revised by the council before
July 1, 1966. The council set derived intervention prices for thirty-eight marketing
centers in the Community. The decisions also provided for payments to be made to
Italian and German farmers who would be adversely affected by the required lowering
of Italian and German target prices. Italy is authorized to decrease levies on imports
of barley and maize on condition that the imports are not trans-shipped to other mem-
ber states. Germany and Luxembourg are authorized to increase intervention pay-
ments for rye which can be used for human consumption. The Decisions of 15 Decem-
ber 1964, EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, pp. 8-14. In order to ease the adjustments required
of high-cost farmers in some member states, it was agreed that German, Italian and
Luxembourg farmers should receive compensatory payments at a decreasing annual
rate for the years 1967-1968, 1968-1969 and 1969-1970. The total amounts to be paid
from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund are: Germany-280
million; Italy-$131 million; and Luxembourg--V% million. Id. at 15.
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to maintain living standards for producers who are relatively inefficient
within the Community. France, as a low-cost producer, has tended to
set target prices relatively low. An approximation of prices will re-
quire Germany to lower and France to raise their respective national
target and intervention prices. This will result in lower German mar-
ket prices, higher French market prices, and free Franco-German
trade. Marginal German producers who depended on the high price
level will be squeezed off the market. Increased prices in France will
lead to increased supply, at least to the extent that supply is elastic.
Moreover, this increased supply will offset the reduction of production
in Germany caused by lower German price levels. This is also what
would have happened if intra-community tariffs and quotas had been
abolished (absent member state farm programs), except that price
equalization in a customs union framework would have followed,
rather than preceded, free trade. Moreover, the final price level under
the market organization will be a supported price which may be higher
than a free market price would have been and could lead to surpluses
within the Community.
5. Effect on Third Countries. Since world suppliers can compete in
the Common Market only if it experiences an absolute deficit of the
product involved,"°5 the question of significance to third countries is
whether increases of production in low-cost member states as a result
of the common grain prices will be greater or lesser than decreases in
production in high-cost member states. This depends on the level of
the common prices. If they are set at a high level, few marginal pro-
ducers will be squeezed off the market and efficient producers will grow
much more grain; if they are low, increases in production will be small
compared to decreased production in high-cost countries. Conflicting
estimates have been made as to the effect of the common grain price
levels to be effective from July 1, 1967.16 As to agricultural products
grown in the Community, however, it seems reasonable to assume that
the net effect of the common price levels will be an increase in over-all
105 If there is a surplus of grains, the excess supply would force market prices down
to target price levels. Third countries can sell only at levels slightly higher than tar-
get prices. Deficits could cause market prices to rise above target price levels. If the
target price is X, a deficit could cause local prices to rise to X plus 10. If third coun-
try imports could be sold for X + 3, third country producers could undersell those
marginal producers who require a price of between X + 3 and X + 10.106 Compare the Commission Proposals for a Common Level of Grain Prices, EEC
Bulletin, Dec. 1963, pp. 12, 14, 15 with EEC ComM'N, JOINT REPORT BY MEMBERS OF
THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ATTACHED TO THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND
ECoNOMIc ADVISERS FOR THE EEC COMMISSION 4 (Studies, Agricultural Series No. 11
-Brussels, 1962).
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Community production, lessening possibilities of agricultural exports
to the Community by third countries.
6. Effect of Common Grain Prices on Other Products. The agree-
ment of December 15, 1964, was a very significant one. Although the
agreement related only to certain grains and grain conversion prod-
ucts (pork, eggs and poultry), the price levels of those products affect
the prices of many other agricultural products, such as beef and dairy
products. The agreement therefore gave substance to the hope that a
single market in agriculture could be attained by July 196717 Accel-
erations in the elimination of intra-community tariffs and quotas raised
similar hopes for integration of the industrial markets.
C. Market Organizations in Other Sectors
Integration in agriculture has followed a sector-by-sector approach.
Despite the formal independence of these separate organizations, how-
ever, many common elements are present. Most common organizations
established for agricultural markets of products other than grain also
utilize the price and levy systems, either separately or in conjunction
with each other, but with variations designed to fit the systems to the
peculiar needs of the markets involved. Some of these other market
organizations, on the other hand, are based upon the principle of cus-
toms unions (i.e., abolition of intra-community tariffs and the creation
of a common external tariff) without relying primarily upon price and
levy systems, but even in these organizations price supports and levies
of some type are authorized as supplemental or emergency measures.
1. Grain Conversion Products-Pork, Eggs and Poultry Organiza-
tions.0 ' These three organizations are based almost exclusively on the
levy system. The levies consist of separate components based upon
(a) differences in the cost of grain required to produce these products
and (b) the need to protect domestic feeders, packers and processers. 9
As intra-community grain price differentials are eliminated, the first
10 T The council also decided that the fixed element of the intra-community levy on
pork, eggs and poultry (designed to protect processors) should be eliminated by July
1, 1967, thus creating a free market in all grain conversion products. See The Deci-
sions of 15 December 1964, in EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, pp. 8, 17.
108 Council Reg. No. 20, Establishment of a Common Market Organization for
Pork, J.O.C.E. 945/62, as amended (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 20) ; Council Reg.
No. 21, Establishment of a Common Market Organization for Eggs, J.O.C.E. 953/62,
as amended (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 21) ; Councl Reg. No. 22, Establishment
of a Common Market Organisation for Poultry, J.O.C.E., 959/62, as amended (here-
inafter cited as Reg. No. 22). All Regulations, as amended, are translated in 1 CCH
COMMrON MIKT. REP. paras. 481-563.109 Reg. No. 20(3), (4) ; Reg. No. 21(3) ; Reg. No. 22(3).
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component of the intra-community levy will disappear automatically.11
The second component of the intra-community levy is also to be elim-
inated gradually.'
With the exception of certain emergency measures for pork,11 - there
is no price system. There are accordingly no "target prices" or "inter-
vention prices" for pork, eggs or poultry. In one sense these are not
needed because guaranteed grain prices should be reflected in the prices
of grain conversion products. But the market is not an exact mech-
anism. The fact that a feeder produces pork using grain purchased at
target prices does not mean that he will necessarily receive enough for
his pork to cover his feed costs. For this reason, Regulation No. 20
allows (but does not require) member states to intervene in the pork
market "by measures suitable for mitigating a significant drop in
prices. '  (There are no similar provisions in the regulations for the
egg and poultry markets.) With the exception of this price support
measure for pork, the common organizations of the pork, egg and
poultry markets rely primarily upon the price systems of the grain
market organization, supplemented by their own levy systems, which
operate in the following manner:
First, as to intra-community trade during the transitional period,
the first component of the levy (based on feed-cost differentials be-
tween exporting and importing member states"..) is calculated by de-
termining how much feed is required to produce one kilogram of pork,
eggs or poultry. The respective costs of this amount of feed will be
compared for the two member states and the excess in cost of the im-
porting member state will be the amount of the first component of the
levy. The second component is a fixed amount based upon differences
in processing costs in the importing and exporting member states." 5
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Reg. No. 20(9).
:11 Reg. No. 20(9).
114 Reg. No. 20(3); Reg. No. 21(3); Reg. No. 22(3). Feed cost differentials are
set by the council. Since grains used could differ, the council sets a rather arbitrary
"grain unit" and a grain unit price for each member state. The amount of grain
required to produce an item (as well as its price) differs from country to country and
from year to year. The amount of technical detail involved in basing levies on these
concepts is illustrated in Council Regs. No. 33 and 36 concerning the determination of
the amount of feed grains necessary for the production of one kilogram of poultry and
one kilogram of eggs, J.O.C.E. 1513/62 and 1516/62.
115 For pork, the total amount of the two components cannot exceed differences in
market prices in the importing and exporting member states. Reg. No. 20(3). As to
eggs, the initial processing component was to be no more than 5% or the 1962 duty.
Reg. No. 21(3). For poultry, the initial processing component was to be no more
than 6% or the 1962 duty. Reg. No. 22(3). These second components of intra-
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Assume that the feeding cost of producing one unit of pork is 2 dollars
in Germany and 1 dollar in Holland. The first component of the intra-
community levy on imports of Dutch pork into Germany would be 1
dollar. If the respective processing costs in Holland and Germany are
1 dollar and 2 dollars, the second component of the levy would also be
set at 1 dollar, resulting in a total levy of 2 dollars."16
As grain prices within the Common Market are approximated, the
first component of the levy disappears automatically. The second com-
ponent of the levy was to be reduced at a minimum rate of two-fif-
teenths each year."' The Council's decision to approximate grain
prices by July 1, 1967, will eliminate the first component of the levy.
The Council also agreed to eliminate the second component of the levy
by the same date."'
The levies applicable to imports from third countries are based upon
similar components. The feed-cost differential component for pork is
based upon the difference between (a) feed-costs in the member state
where pork prices are lowest and (b) the lowest feed-costs on the
world market. If the import goes to a member state other than that in
which the pork prices are lowest ("minimum price member state"), an
additional levy, equal to the levy on exports from the minimum price
member state to the importing member state, is also imposed." 9
Finally, a stated percentage of the import price is added on to the levy
(ranging from two per cent for the 1962-1963 marketing year to seven
per cent when the single market stage is achieved).12 The effect of the
first component of the levy is to equalize feeding costs on the world
market with those prevailing in the minimum price member state. The
second element subjects the third country exporter to the highest intra-
community levy. (As Community pork prices are approximated, this
element of the levy on imports from third countries will be eliminated.)
The two to seven per cent amount added to levies on imports from third
community levies are to be reduced at the rate of 2/15 per year. Reg. No. 20(12);
Reg. No. 21(9) ; Reg. No. 22(9).
116 However, since the levy cannot exceed the difference between the average
market prices in the two states, the levy would be equal to such difference if the
difference were less than two dollars. Reg. No. 20(3) (1) (b).117 See note 115 supra.
I's See The Decisions of 15 December 1964, EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, p. 17.
"19 Reg. No. 20(5). Regulations Nos. 21 and 22 achieve a similar result in a some-
what different manner. The first element of the third country import levy is based on
feed cost differentials between the world market and whatever importing member
state is involved. The second element of the pork levy (the levy imposed on imports
from the minimum price member state) does not exist. A second component designed
to protect growers and processors is also imposed.
12 0 Reg. No. 20(5) ; Reg. No. 21(4) ; Reg. No. 22(4).
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countries is similar to the "standard amount" in that it creates a Com-
munity preference.
It can be seen that the first element of the levy merely equalizes
feeding costs between the Community and third countries. Since some
third country producers may dispose of pork at prices which do not
reflect actual feeding costs, the levy does not guarantee protection
against imports at abnormally low prices. This problem is met by set-
ting a "sluice gate" price-a price the Council of Ministers considers
to be reasonable based on world feed grain prices.' 2' If the actual
world market price drops below this price, an additional levy is im-
posed equal to the difference between the actual world market price
and the sluice gate price. 2
2. Milk and Dairy Products." This market organization applies to
fresh and various kinds of preserved milk and cream, butter, cheese
and curd, lactose, and compound feeding preparations containing milk
products and not covered by the market organization for grain.2 The
levy system of this organization does not now apply to fresh milk and
cream, but does apply to other "processed dairy products" and to feed
preparations. If fresh milk and cream are disregarded, this market
organization is very similar to that for grain. The position of wheat,
barley, maize and rye as "base products" (with prices supported inter-
nally) is taken in this case by butter. Price levels of butter are guar-
anteed internally by purchases at the "intervention price," resulting in
an indirect support of the price of other processed dairy products as
121 The establishment of sluice-gate prices... is justified by the fact that conditions
of international trade are not such as to make it possible to reckon on supplies
always being offered at prices which correspond to the main factors of produc-
tion.... Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying Draft Regulation Providing
for the... Gradual Establishment of a Common Market Organization in the Pig-
meat Sector, EEC Bulletin, July-Aug., 1961, pp. 105, 107.
'
22 Reg. No. 20(7). Sluice-gate prices in respect of imports from member states
may also be set during the transitional stage in respect of pork (Reg. No. 20(8)), but
not in respect of eggs or poultry. See Reg. No. 21 (6) ; Reg. No. 22(6).
123 Council Reg. No. 13/64 establishing a common market organization for milk
and dairy products, J.O.C.E. 549/64, as amended, translated with amendments in
1 CCH COMMON MKT. REG. 641 (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 13/64). The inter-
vention and trading system of the market was to be applied as of November 1, 1964.
Council Reg. No. 82/64, J.O.C.E 1626/64.
124 Reg. No. 13/64(1). The regulation applies to certain types of cheeses which are
the subject of GATT agreements in modified form only. Reg. No. 13/64(2). The
levy system for feeding preparations (normally containing grains as well as dried
milk) is similar to that applicable to complex processed grain products. The levy
consists of two components-one designed to reflect levies that would have been
imposed on the base products going into the preparation (chiefly grains and powdered
milk) and a second element designed to protect local processing industries. Reg. No.
13/64(6). See GATT, TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. REPORTS OF CommiTTE
II ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 14. (Sales No.:
GATT 1965-1).
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well. 20 The levy system applicable to intra-community trade and to
imports from third countries is also similar to that for grains except
that in this sector the proper relationship between threshold prices for
butter on the one hand and for products not supported by intervention
purchases on the other is made more precise by reliance on the concept
of "reference prices" for each product included in this organization-
even those whose prices are not supported internally. 2 ' Reference
prices for the 1964-1965 marketing year were based on actual market
prices for the 1963 calendar year. 27 Reference prices for subsequent
years are to be modified, taking into account the development of target
prices for fresh milk, discussed below, and the need gradually to ap-
proximate prices. Threshold prices are equal to the reference prices
increased by the "standard amount."' 28 Thus, by applying the inter-
vention purchase mechanism to butter and using the device of "refer-
ence prices," internal prices are supported and a standard is set for the
computation of all levies. As in the case of grains, levies are equal to
the difference between the threshold price of the importing member
state and the free-to-frontier price (or the c.i.f. price),29 with a reduc-
tion of a standard amount from the levy in cases of imports from mem-
ber states. 3 ° Although a single market is to be achieved by the ap-
proximation of prices, the December 15, 1964, decisions of the Council
setting common prices for grain as of July 1, 1967, do not apply to
dairy products.' 3 '
12 5 Reg. No. 13/64(21). Member states can also grant aids for the private storage
of butter, consisting of costs of storage and compensation for decreases in value
attributable to storage. See Council Reg. No. 62/64, concerning interventions on the
butter market, J.O.C.E. 1412/64.
126 Reg. No. 13/64 (5).
127 Ibid.
128 Other minor modifications may also be made under Reg. No. 13/64(3).
329 Criteria and procedures for setting c.i.f. and free-to-frontier prices are similar
to those established for grain products. See GATT, op. cit. supra, note 124, at 7-10.
Some member states grant subsidies to producers equal to the difference-between the
domestic market price and a domestic producer price guaranteed by the member state.
This keeps prices low and levies on exports to other member states high. In such cases
the exporting member state may impose a countervailing duty on exports, equal to the
local subsidy (which does not harm the exporter since it reduces the amount of the
levy) on condition that subsidies in the same amount are granted in respect of imports
of the same product. Reg. No. 13/64(10). See Council Reg. No. 114/64, concerning
compensatory amounts and subsidies under article 10 of Reg. No. 13/64, J.O.C.E.
2187/64.
130 Reg. No. 13/64(4). The levy on those feeding preparations containing milk
products and not covered by Reg. No. 19 is based upon (a) dairy product price differ-
entials, (b) protective components to protect domestic processing industries and (c) the
amount of levies or duties that would be imposed upon non-dairy products going into
the feed preparations. Reg. No. 13/64(6).
131 See Document 27, Parlement Europeen, Documents de Seance, Exposd des
Motifs 1 5 & 6, April 14, 1965. Paragraph 6 states "it is necessary to issue, as soon as
possible, analogous decisions guaranteeing, as of July 1, 1967, the application of
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Since the levy system does not apply to fresh milk and cream, 3 2
trade in those products is presumably governed by the general provi-
sions of the Treaty relating to the abolition of intra-community tariffs
and quotas and the creation of a common external tariff. The absence
of a levy system may be due to the fact that although fresh milk and
cream are extremely significant in the domestic economies of each
member state, they are impractical for long shipment and are therefore
not a significant part of international or even intra-community trade. 3
But even though the levy system does not-and perhaps need not-
apply to fresh milk and cream, the prices of these products in mem-
ber states must be gradually approximated, because the price of proc-
essed dairy products is necessarily affected by the prices of fresh milk
and cream. Creating a single market for processed dairy products re-
quires an approximation of their prices, which in turn requires an ap-
proximation of the prices of fresh milk and cream. This approximation
is to be achieved by attaining one common milk "target price." This
target price will not necessarily be the actual market price but may in-
stead be the price guaranteed to the producer. If the market price falls
below the target price, member states (corresponding to previous prac-
tices in member states) pay the difference to the producer in the form
of a subsidy. 4 These subsidies may vary in each member state, de-
pending on the local market price and the producer's efficiency.' The
regulation establishing the common organization of the market for milk
and dairy products provides that member states, within maximum and
minimum limits set by the Council of Ministers, are to set annual tar-
get prices which are to be the prices guaranteed to the producer for
each kilogram of milk having a stated butterfat content. 8 This price
may be "guaranteed" by paying to the producer a sum equal to the
amount by which the target price exceeds the market price. 7 By the
common target or guide prices ... particularly common target prices for rice and milk
[and] guide prices for beef and veal...."
132 The Community indicated that the council would "make special arrangements
for this sector by 1 July 1965." EEC Bulletin, Jan. 1965, p. 34. See GATT, op. cit.
supra, note 124, at 4.
13.3 "In general the markets in liquid milk are local and regional; apart from certain
exceptions in frontier areas there is no international trade...."Explanatory memo-
random accompanying proposed regulation cocerning... Progressive Establishment of
a Common Organization of the Markets in Milk and Dairy Products, 21, in supple-
ment to EEC Bulletin, July, 1962.
134 Government supports in the milk and dairy markets have cost the member states
an aggregate of about $500,000,000 annually. See Preamble to Reg. No. 13/64.
1.33 See GATT, op. cit. supra, note 124, at 13-14.
136 Reg. No. 13/16(47). Council Reg. No. 37/64 concerning the setting of maxi-
mum and minimum target prices of milk for 1964-1965, J.O.C.E. 826/64, set the limits
of the target prices at 10.5c and 7.95c per kg., respectively.
137 Ibid.
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end of the transitional period, target prices of fresh milk and cream
are to be approximated,' so that producers all over the Community
will be guaranteed a single price. Since milk price approximation is
only supplemental to approximation of market prices of processed
dairy products, it is sufficient to create one guaranteed producer price;.
a single consumer market price is not required since fresh milk is not
included in the levy system. Annual milk target prices should, of
course, bear a proper relationship to annual reference prices for
processed dairy products so that a proper relationship exists when
prices are approximated.
3. Common Market Organizations Based on a Customs Union Sys-
tem with Supplementary Measures. The variable levy is not the basic
element of the market organization for fruits and vegetables"3 9 or the
market organization for beef and veal."" Trade in fruits and vege-
tables is to be released from the quota system progressively, with the
highest grades of produce being freed first, so that by the end of 1968
there will be no quota restrictions applied to intra-community trade.'
In other respects, the scheme of the organization for fruits and vege-
tables is to subject the fruit and vegetable market to the general pro-
visions of the Treaty: Intra-community tariffs are to be abolished; 42
separate member state tariffs in respect of third countries are to be
replaced by one common external tariff; 43 state aids, such as subsidies
and price supports are prohibited." However, if the offering price of
13s Instead of reducing the difference between maximum and minimum national
target prices, the council sets an annual "common target price." Member states are
gradually to accommodate their national prices to this common price in accordance
with decisions of the council. Reg. No. 13/64(18).
139 Council Reg. No. 23, establishing a common market organization for fruits and
vegetables, J.O.C.E. 965/62, as amended, translated with amendments in 1 CCH
ComtoN MKT. REP. 567 (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 23). The trading system of
Reg. No. 23 became effective on July 30, 1962 (See Reg. No. 23, art. 16).
140 Council Reg. No. 14/64, establishes a common market organization for beef
and veal, J.O.C.E. 562/64, translated in 1 CCH CommoN MKT. REP. 1 701 (hereinafter
cited as Reg. No. 14/64). The trading system of Reg. No. 14/64 did not apply until
November 1, 1964. See Council Reg. No. 82/64, J.O.C.E. 1626/64.
'41 Reg. No. 23 (9). Goods in the quality grades classified as "Extra," "I" and "II"
are to be freed from trade restrictions on the respective dates of July 29, 1962, Decem-
ber 31, 1963, and December 31, 1965, at the latest. See Council Reg. No. 49, J.O.C.E.
1571/62. As of January 1, 1966, only those goods not falling into one of these three
categories can be subjected to quota systems.
3.4 2 Reg. No. 23 (8).
143 Ibid.
14 4 Reg. No. 23(7). Council Reg. No. 24, establishing a common market organiza-
tion for vine products, as amended, J.O.C.E. 989/62 (translated with amendments in
1 CCH CoMMoN MYT. REP. ff 613) is also based on a customs union structure. The
"organization" of this market consists of registries designed to give the Community
full information concerning vine stocks and production. During the transitional period
trade in wine will be subject to the quota system. Import quotas have been established
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produce from third countries becomes unreasonably low, an additional
duty, equal to the difference between the export offering price and a so-
called "reference price" (similar in concept to the "sluice-gate" price
for pork and set at a level the Council considers reasonable for general
third-country price levels) may be imposed."4 5
The market organization for beef and veal is also based upon a
customs union framework but is supplemented by both a levy system
and a price system.' The primary regulator of international and
intra-community trade will be customs duties rather than levies. In
addition, however, each member state is to set "guide prices" for live
cattle, within maximum and minimum limits set by the Council of
Ministers. National guide prices for the 1964-1965 and 1965-1966
marketing years are based on 1962-1963 national market prices. Guide
prices of member states are thereafter to be approximated gradually,
pursuant to decisions of the Council.""7 Each state is authorized (but
not required) to support these guide prices by intervention purchases
of live cattle at ninety-three to ninety-six per cent of the guide price."'
Guide prices are protected against foreign imports by means of a sup-
plemental variable levy. If the import price plus the duty imposed
amount to a sum less than the guide price, a variable levy equal to the
difference may be imposed. 9
In respect to imports from third countries the entire amount of the
levy may be imposed if the local market price is lower than the guide
price. If the market price is more than five per cent above the guide
by the Council for Germany, France and Italy. See Council Decision concerning the
setting of quotas to be opened by the Federal Republic of Germany, the French
Republic and the Italian Republic for the importation of wines, J.O.C.E. 1002/62, as
amended, J.O.C.E. 2242/63. Thus, while the market organizations for other sectors
eliminate quotas, they do not for the sectors of vine products and fruit and vegetables.
145 This additional "countervailing duty" does not apply to intra-community trade.
Reg. No. 23(11), as amended by Council Reg. No. 65/65, J.O.C.E. 1458/65, effective
May 20, 1965. In computing reference prices, each member state ascertains average
producer prices for the preceding three-year period. The various member state prices
are then averaged and distribution costs are added on. The sum is the reference price.
Ibid. The reference price is the same for all member states.
146 See preamble to Reg. No. 14/64; Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying the
Proposed Regulation Concerning the Gradual Establishment of a Common Organiza-
tion of the Beef Market, ff 5, supplement to EEC Bulletin, July, 1962, pp. 15-24.
14T Reg. No. 14/64(2).
148 Intervention purchases of calves and veal are not authorized. Reg. No.
14/64(10). Italy and Luxembourg have already indicated they will make no inter-
vention purchases during the first marketing year. See GATT, op. cit. supra note 124,
at 28. Intervention purchases can be made only if the market price has been lower
than the intervention price for a period of at least seven successive days; they must
cease when the market price has risen to a level above the intervention price for a
period of seven successive days. Council Reg. No. 55/64, concerning criteria relating
to intervention system in the beef sector, J.O.C.E. 1287/64.
1
49 Reg. No. 14/64(5).
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price, no supplemental levy may be imposed. If the market price is at
least equal to, but not more than five per cent above the guide price,
one-half of the levy may be imposed. 5 This may be illustrated by the
following example:
Assume that the German guide price for a stated quantity and quality
of beef is 100 dollars and that the c.i.f. price of beef imported from
third countries is 70 dollars. If Germany imposes a duty of 30 dollars
on the import, the total import price will equal the guide price and no
duty will be imposed. However, if the c.i.f. price drops to 50 dollars, a
supplemental levy may be imposed, depending on German market con-
ditions. If the German market price is 100 dollars or less, a supple-
mental levy of 20 dollars may be imposed, bringing the total import
price to 100 dollars. If the German market price is more than 105
dollars, no supplemental levy may be imposed, so that the total import
price will be 80 dollars. If the German market price is between 100
dollars and 105 dollars, a supplemental levy of 10 dollars may be im-
posed, bringing the total import price to 90 dollars.
Supplemental levies may also be imposed on intra-community trade, 5'
but since member state guide prices are to be approximated during the
course of the transitional period, supplemental intra-community levies
will be gradually eliminated. During the transitional period, the same
supplemental levy applicable to imports from third countries may be
imposed if a member state supports prices by means of intervention
purchases, except that the guide price is first reduced by five per cent
in computing the levy.'52 If a member state does not support internal
prices by intervention purchases (it is not required to do so),' the
supplemental levy may be imposed only when the market price is more
than ten per cent less than the guide price. When this condition exists,
the supplemental levy may not exceed the difference between the import
price plus duty and the guide price reduced by ten per cent.15'
150 Ibid. Although guide prices exist only for live cattle, the equivalent of guide
prices for slaughtered beef and veal (for purposes of computing the supplemental levy)
are computed by the use of coefficients. Reg. 14/64(5) (2).
16l Reg. 14/64(11). '152 However, if the intervention price is set at 95-96% of the guide price, the supple-
mental levy is the difference between the intervention price and the import price
increased by the import charge. Reg. No. 14/64(11) (3).
153 See note 148 supra.54 Reg. No. 14/64(11), paras. 4 & 5. A regulation for the Gradual Establishment of
a Common Market Organization for Fats and Oils has been proposed by the Commis-
sion. See 1 CCH ComanoN MxT. REP. 1 815. As to fats and oils not produced by the
Community the organization would be based on a customs union framework. However,
as to olive oil which is produced within the Community in substantial amounts (notably
in Italy), a target price-intervention price-variable levy type of organization is proposed.
See Council Resolution No. 64/128 concerning basic principles of the common organi-
zation for fats and oils, J.O.C.E. 602/64.
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V. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKET ORGANIZATIONS FOR
DIFFERENT SECTORS
A. Council-Commission Relations; Management Committees
The administrative process is often thought to include only one level
in the rule-making hierarchy. Principles and goals are set forth in the
authorizing statute; within this framework a discretionary rule making
power is delegated to an administrative agency which acts by issuing
regulations. The administrative agency itself, however, is not normally
authorized to delegate a rule making power to another agency.' How-
ever, the regulations adopted by the Council establishing common
market organizations, although extremely detailed, are themselves
often mere "outline laws" whose administration requires supplemental
decisions.' These additional rules can range from extremely import-
ant decisions such as the approximation of national target prices to
technical matters involving no great discretion, such as the weekly
setting of c.i.f. prices for grain. In some cases these regulations and
decisions may be adopted by the Council of Ministers and in some
cases the rule making power may be delegated to the Commission.
This delegation of authority from the Council to the Commission in
the area of agricultural trade and regulation could create legal prob-
lems. The Treaty specifically authorizes the Council to "adopt regu-
lations or directitves, or take decisions" to effect a common agricultural
policy. The Treaty does not delegate such authority to the Commis-
sion. Article 155 does, however, authorize the Commission to "exercise
the powers conferred on it by the Council to ensure effect being given
to the rules laid down by the latter." It therefore appears that the
Council may delegate to the Commission authority to adopt regula-
tions which are matters of mere technical application, but that decisions
on matters concerning basic policy are to be made only by the Council.
Thus, the approximation of Community prices and the setting of the
eventual common prices are to be effected by the Council." 7 The mere
155 Exceptions do exist in practice. The Internal Revenue Code, for example,
sometimes delegates a rule making power to the Secretary of the Treasury "or his
delegate." In practice, the power is then delegated to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7623; Treas. Reg. § 1.7623. (Power to
issue regulations authorizing the payment of sums to informers delegated by statute to
the Secretary "or his delegate"; regulation issued by Treasury delegates to District
Director of Internal Revenue power to pay informer "such award as he deems suit-
able.")
156 Megret, Principes du Rigime Applicable a L'Agriculture dans le Marchi
Co,,mun, 7 REVUE Dt MARCH t COMMUN 267, 286 (1964).
157 Reg. No. 19 (6) (common target prices for grains); Reg. No. 13/64(18)(common target price for milk); Reg. No. 14/64(2) (common guide prices for
cattle).
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setting of free-to-frontier prices for grain, on the other hand, would
seem to be a technical matter for decision by the Commission.' But
not all decisions can be so easily classified, such as, for example, the
setting down of criteria (supplemental to those provided in the basic
regulation) for the fixing of free-to-frontier prices."" The scope of this
problem may be illustrated by a partial listing of decisions that must
be taken under Regulation No. 19:
(1) Decisions adopted directly by the Council:
(a) Setting of annual maximum and minimum target prices, event-
ual common price levels, common threshold and intervention prices,
and a single Community border crossing point for purposes of deter-
mining c.i.f. prices. 6
(b) Setting amounts of levy components for complex processed
grain products designed to protect domestic and Community pro-
ducers.'
(c) Addition or deletion of products to be included within the orga-
nization.' 2
(2) Decisions not adopted directly by the Council:
(a) Determination of free-to-frontier prices and c.i.f. prices. 3
(b) Revision of threshold prices set by member states.'64
(c) Setting quality standards for products for which various prices
are fixed, together with "equalizing coefficients" to enable the price
and levy systems to be applied to products not conforming to the
stated standards. 6 '
(d) Determination of whether member states may invoke "safe-
guard clauses" to avoid or minimize domestic market disturbances.'66
While this breakdown is not all-inclusive and is not necessarily an
exact reflection of the breakdown in organizations other than that for
grain, it does give a fairly accurate picture of the kind of division of
authority between the Council and the Commission in all organizations.
It is apparent that the decisions adopted by the Council are matters of
158 Reg. No. 19(3) ; Reg. No. 13/64(3).
159 This power is in fact exercised by the Commission after consulting the grain
management committee. See Commission Reg. No. 89 concerning the criteria for the
determination of free-to-frontier prices for grains, flours, etc., J.O.C.E. 1899/62.
160 Reg. No. 19(5), (6), (13).
161 Reg. No. 19(8), (14) 164 Reg. No. 19(4).
162 Reg. No. 19(24). 165 Reg. No. 19(12).
163 Reg. No. 19(3), (10) 166 Reg. No. 19(22).
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policy, while those not so adopted primarily concern techniques of
applying or executing that policy.' 7
Regulations and decisions not issued by the Council directly are
adopted by the Commission with the aid of a separate management
committee for each sector.' The management committee serves both
as an advisory committee and as a link between the Commission and
the Council. Each committee consists of one representative from each
member state. Prior to the adoption of a measure, the Commission
submits it to the committee which may approve, disapprove, or revise.
The Commission then, as a general rule, may act independently of the
committee's views, but if the action conflicts with the committee's
recommendations, the Council must be notified. It has been suggested
that the Council intended, by creating these Committees, to strengthen
the influence of member states over the Commission.'
B. Intervention Measures, Export Refunds and State Aids
Generally speaking, all state aids not authorized in the market
organization regulations are prohibited.' However, as indicated
above, member states are authorized (in the case of pork and beef)...
or required (in the case of certain grains and butter) 72 to support price
levels by means of purchasing products at a price slightly below the
target or reference price.' This kind of price support is expensive
and creates storage problems. If a surplus exists, it is far better to
export these products on the world market. Because Community
market prices as a rule are higher than world market prices,'74 the
167 See Sgarlatta v. EEC Commission, translated in CCH Common Market, REP.
1 8034; Olmi, The Agricultural Policy of the Community, 1 C.M.L. Rxv. 118, 145-46
(1963).
168 See Reg. No. 19(25), (26) ; Reg. No. 20(19), (20) ; Regs. Nos. 21 & 22, arts.
(16) & (17) (same committee serves both the egg and the poultry organizations) ;
Reg. No. 23(12), (13) ; Reg. No. 24(6), (7) ; Reg. No. 13/64(24), (25); Reg. No.
14/64(19), (20) ; Reg. No. 16/64(23), (24).
169 See Keller, Die Agrarpolitischen Beschluesse der EWG, 14 WIRTSCHAFT UND
REcHT 114 (1965).
170 Reg. No. 19(19) (prohibited to extent prices are affected) ; Reg. No. 20(16)
Reg. No. 21(13) (with exceptions during transitional period) ; Reg. No. 22(13) ; Reg.
No. 23(7); Reg. No. 13/64(13) (with exceptions); Reg. No. 14/64(14) (exception
for Luxembourg) ; Reg. No. 16/64(13).
171 Reg. No. 20(9) ; Reg. No. 14/64(10).
172 Reg. No. 19(7) ; Reg. No. 13/64(21); Reg. No. 16/64(18).
173 Subsidies are direct payments to producers and do not support prices. Such
aids may be paid to producers of durum wheat, Reg. No. 19(11), and fresh milk,
Reg. No. 13/64(17).
174 The commission has stated that "agricultural prices within the Community
generally cannot be at the same level as world prices, but must be stabilized at a
higher level." EEC COMM'N, PROPOSITIONS CONCERNANT L'ELABORATION ET LA MIsE-
EN OEUVRE DE LA PoLIrIQUE AGRIOLE COMMUNE, (Brussels, 1960), quoted and trans-
lated in TRACY, AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE 349 (1964).
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Community has resorted to the device of the "export refund" to enable
their producers to compete on the world market. Producers who sell
to third countries are given a refund or subsidy approximately equal to
the difference between the local price and the world market price' 5
The amount of refund is calculated by computing the levy applicable
to imports of a given product from third countries; the rate of this
levy is the rate of the export refund allowed to Community pro-
ducers."' So far, this has been the largest expense involved in financ-
ing the common agricultural policy'
C. Safeguard Clauses
Although the trade restrictions set forth in the market organizations
are intended to replace all other trade restrictions of member states or
of the Community, such as quotas, individual tariffs, and import
taxes, 7" all major market organizations allow member states, at least
during the transitional period, to take emergency actions restricting
imports of certain goods in order to prevent or minimize serious dis-
turbances of the domestic market. If such measures are adopted by a
state, it must take efforts not to impede the importation of goods in
transit and must in any event keep its borders open for three days. It
must notify the Commission of its action within a period of four days
from the time it invokes safeguard measures and the Commission must
decide within an additional four days whether the action is to be con-
tinued, modified or revoked." 9 A state can appeal the decision of the
Commission to the Council, which can affirm, modify or repeal the
decision. The appeal to the Council does not stay the effect of the
Commission's decision, except in the case of grains and dairy products,
1'r See Reg. No. 19(20); Reg. No. 20(11); Reg. No. 21(8); Reg. No. 22(8);
Reg. No. 13/64(14) ; Reg. No. 14/64(15); Reg. No. 16/64(15). See Reg. No. 19(11),
(19); Reg. No. 20(10); Reg. No. 21(7); Reg. No. 22(7). Export refunds are
apparently not allowed in sectors of beef and veal, fruit and vegetables, and wine.
176 See Commission Reg. No. 90 concerning refunds applicable to grain exports,
J.O.C.E. 1902/62, as amended by Commission Reg. No. 152, J.O.C.E. 2911/62.
177 Over 80% of the amounts allocated by the guarantee section of the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund in the 1962-1963 year were for export
refunds. Annex to Document 27, Parlement Europ6en Documents de S6ance 18, April
14, 1965. The guarantee section accounts for 75% of the fumd's expenditures. See
Council Reg. No. 17/64 concerning the conditions for assistance from the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, art. 18, J.O.C.E. 586/64.
173 See notes 181-84 infra.
179 See, e.g., Reg. No. 19(22); Reg. No. 20(15); Reg. No. 21(12); Reg. No.
22(12); Reg. No. 23(10); Reg. No. 13/64(16); Reg. No. 14/64(16); Reg. No.
16/ 64(16). There are no express safeguard clauses in the market organization for
wine.
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where an appeal suspends the application of the Commission's decision
for a period of up to ten days.'
D. Substitutes for Other Restrictions
As a general rule, common organizations of the market eliminate all
other restrictions upon intra-community trade and trade with third
countries. Variable levies are substituted for quotas and tariffs as
frontier measures of protection.18' There are exceptions to this general
rule, however. For example, quotas on imports of fruit and vegetables,
although to be removed in respect of intra-community trade over the
transitional period, are not eliminated at the outset by Regulation
No. 23.182 In addition, tariffs imposed on imports of fruit, vegetables
and beef from third countries are not eliminated. 3 The Council of
Ministers can also authorize the application of quota systems even
when they are replaced as a general matter by variable levies. A special
rule in respect to intra-community trade applies to trade with Luxem-
bourg, which is authorized to maintain quantitative restrictions during
the transitional period on the importation of certain specifically desig-
nated products. 4 The Council has also authorized member states to
subject imports from socialist state-trading countries to the quota sys-
tem. The reason given for this special measure is that levies might not
be sufficient to protect domestic markets from disturbances caused by
imports from such countries.' It is doubtful whether imports from
180 See Reg. No. 19(22) ; Reg. No. 13/64(16).
181See, e.g., Reg. No. 19(18); Reg. No. 20(14); Reg. No. 21(11); Reg. No.
22(11) ; Reg. No. 13/64(12) ; Reg. No. 14/64 (12) ; Reg. No. 16/64(12).
182 See Reg. No. 23(8) and (9). See note 141 supra. Quotas on wine are also
allowed and have been established for imports into Germany, France and Italy. See
council decision concerning the setting of quotas to be opened by the Federal Republic
of Germany, the French Republic and the Italian Republic for the importation of
wines, J.O.C.E. 1002/62, as amended by Council Decision 63/475, J.O.C.E. 2242/63.
183 See text accompanying notes 139-46 supra.
184 Protocol Concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1 CCH CoMMoN MKT.
REP. ff 996. See Reg. No. 19(18); Reg. No. 20(14); Reg. No. 21(11); Reg. No.
13/64(12); Reg. No. 14/64(12). The Protocol is not applied in respect of trade in
poultry, fruits and vegetables, wine and rice.
185 The reason stated for applying the quota system to trade with these countries is
that "an uncontrolled liberation of imports ... coming from the countries in question
would create the danger of distorting the equilibrium of exchanges between Member
States and these same third countries." Why such dangers exist only in trade with
state trading countries is a matter requiring further study. See Council Reg. No.
3/63 concerning commercial relations in certain agricultural products with state
trading countries, J.O.C.E. 153/63. The regulation initially applied only to products
covered by Regulations Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 and was to expire on December 31,
1964. The application of the regulation was prolonged to December 31, 1965, and
extended to the rice, beef, and milk and dairy products by Reg. No. 107/64, J.O.C.E.
2137/64. The regulation is permissive only, unless member states allow imports from
state-trading countries in such amounts as to harm other member states, in which
case the member state may be required to restrict imports.
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state-trading countries create special dangers, unless these countries
were to sell at prices far below c.i.f. prices for political or other
purposes.
E. Market Organizations-General Observations
While the means employed in bringing about a Common Market for
agricultural products differ greatly from the methods used for indus-
trial trade and commerce, the goals are similar. The first objective is to
eliminate all barriers to intra-community trade; the second objective is
to bring about a common external trade policy. After prices are
equalized, levies in respect of imports from third countries will be
basically the same, irrespective of which member state is the importer.
The organizational procedure for agriculture differs, however, in that
the levy system, even after the achievement of a single market, will
apply with respect to trade with third countries. Variable levies serve
as absolute barriers to imports below a stated price level; customs
duties do not have the same effect. In addition, the common agricul-
tural market will be a market in which prices are regulated on a Com-
munity scale. By raising or lowering target and related prices, the
Community will be able to guide production within the Community
and will have a tool by which the objectives of article 39 (reasonable
standards of living for farmers, stable supplies, reasonable prices to
producers, etc.) can be achieved. The fact that prices will be regulated
even after the single market stage is reached explains why the levy
system can continue to be used. In a free market, a levy system-a
system whereby import prices would be equalized to domestic prices
no matter how high the domestic prices or how low the import price-
would encourage domestic producers in a free market to raise prices
to an intolerable level. When domestic prices are regulated by public
authorities, however, private producers will not have this opportunity.
Common Market organizations now cover over eighty-five per cent
of Community agriculture production and this will be expanded to over
ninety-five per cent if, as had been expected, regulations are adopted
to organize the sugar, fats, tobacco and fresh milk markets." 6 After
the process of organizing is complete, and especially after the single
market stage is reached, it should be possible to substitute one agricul-
tural code for the proliferation of separate organizations which now
exist. This proliferation makes it difficult to obtain an overall per-
180 See General Significance and Scope of Council Regulations of 32 December
1963, EEC Bulletin, Feb., 1964, p. 40.
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spective of the "common agricultural policy" that was supposed to be
created. The duplication of identical provisions and techniques can
hardly be conducive to efficient administration of these organiza-
tions."' Effective planning requires close coordination, which could
be more easily achieved under one agricultural code.
VI. FINANCING AND GUIDANCE
Although payments to producers in the form of intervention pur-
chases and export refunds are to be made in the first instance by mem-
ber states, a "common policy" implies common financial responsibility,
especially for payments which member states are required to make
under the terms of the market organization regulations. Article 40 of
the Treaty therefore provides that "one or more agricultural guidance
and guarantee funds may be set up" in order to enable the market
organizations to achieve their objectives. Regulation No. 25188 of the
Council establishes a fund which is designed to help finance not only
some of the expenses listed above but also certain expenses involved in
structural redevelopment and improvement programs. Regulation No.
25 establishes Community responsibility for:
(a) Refunds on exports to third countries;
(b) Interventions intended to put the markets in order .... 189
Community responsibility for interventions has been limited to those
interventions which are obligatory or which are substitutes for obliga-
tory actions. Since intervention purchases of certain grains and butter
are required, while purchases of pork and beef, and payments to milk
187 It has been suggested that the rules are too complex to be efficaciously applied
and that an effort to simplify them is indispensable. See Megret, Principes du Rigitne
Applicable a L'Agriculture dans le Marchi Commun, 7 REVUE DU MARCHA COMMUN
267, 290 (1965). A German economist has stated that the common policy has become
a "devils kitchen" in its complexity. Frankfurter Allgemeine, Oct. 2, 1964, p. 29.
188 Council Reg. No. 25, financing of the common agricultural policy, J.O.C.E.
991/62 as amended, translated with amendments in 1 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. fT 901
(hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 25). Explained in Bulletin de la CEE, Feb., 1962. The
fund consists of a "guarantee" section and a "guidance" section. The guarantee sec-
tion, concerned with financing member state expenses for export refunds and inter-
vention purchases accounts for 75% of the fund's expenditures. The "guidance" sec-
tion, which is to help finance expenditures for capital improvements, structural rede-
velopments, educational projects, etc., accounts for 25% of the fund's expenditures.
See Council Reg. No. 17/64, concerning conditions for assistance from the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, art. 18, J.O.C.E. 586/64. Only the guar-
antee section will be considered in this paper. A description of the fund may be found
in Berger, La Place dn F.E.O.G.A. dans la Construction de L'Europe, 8 REVUE DU
MARCHI" COMMON 23 (1965).
189 Reg. No. 25 (2).
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producers are not,1"0 only the former are considered a Community
responsibility.1"'
A supranational "fund" having member states as beneficiaries, is in
one sense nothing more than a re-allocation of expenses. Assume, for
example, that two states agree to set up a fund which is to bear expenses
formerly borne by each state individually. If the fund's resources are
to come from the participating states, a contribution ratio must be
established. If each state agrees to bear one half of the expenses, each
theoretically pays to the fund one half of the fund's requirements. How-
ever, if the fund uses its resources to reimburse the participating states
directly, the participating states need pay to the fund only the excess
of their contribution-obligations over their claims against the fund. Of
course, if the fund makes its payments to citizens of member states
rather than to the participating states directly, each member state
would contribute the entire amount of its contribution-obligation; it
would have no off-setting credits."0 2 The European Agricultural Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund is divided into a guarantee section (used
to compensate member states for intervention payments and export
refunds) and a guidance section' (used to finance structural redevel-
opment programs). Since guidance section payments are not always
made directly to member states, payments to this section must be made
in full.0 4 However, since guarantee section payments are made directly
to member states, only net deficits are paid to the fund and only net
claims are paid to the states. Each year the Commission computes
(a) the obligations of the guarantee section (showing the amounts to
be paid to each member state) and (b) the obligations of each state
to the fund. If the state's contribution-obligation exceeds its claims, it
pays to the fund the amount of the excess. On the other hand, if the
state's claims exceed its contribution-obligation, it receives back from
the fund the amount of the excess.'
10o Compare Reg. No. 19(7), Reg. No. 13/64(21) and Reg. No. 16/68(18) with
Reg. No. 20(9), Reg. No. 13/64(17) and Reg. No. 14/64 (10).101 See Council Reg. No. 17/64 concerning conditions for assistance from the
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), art. 6, J.O.C.E.
586/64 (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 17/64). The fund will also undertake responsi-
bility for payments to be made to German, Italian and Luxembourg farmers pursuant
to the common grain price decisions of December 15, 1964. See 77te Decisions of 15
December 1964, EEC Bulletin, Feb., 1965, pp. 8, 15.
19 2 Compare Muilwijk, The European Social Fund of the EEC, 5 INT. & ComP.
L. Q. Surp. 75 (1962).
193 Council Reg. No. 17/64 concerning assistance from EAGGF, art. 1. See note
188 su pra.194 See Council Reg. No. 64/127 concerning the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund, J.O.C.E. 599/64, arts. 8 & 9.
'Or Reg. No. 64/127, supra note 194, arts. 10 and 11.
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1. Receipts. The revenue of the fund for the 1962-1963 budgetary
year was to consist solely of contributions from member states in the
ratios set forth in article 200(1) of the Treaty relating to member
state contribution-obligations for general expenses of the Commu-
nity."6 For the 1963-1964 and 1964-1965 budgetary years, ninety per
cent and eighty per cent, respectively, of the fund's resources were to
be contributed by member states under the same ratio. The remaining
ten per cent and twenty per cent respectively, were also to be con-
tributed by member states, but in ratios determined by the "net amount
of imports" of each state." 7 Imports to be counted in this calculation
are all products to which Regulation No. 25 applies (grain, pork, eggs,
poultry and dairy products)."' Moreover, the latter calculation is
based on the net amount of imports-not the amount of levies received
in respect of those imports.' Regulation No. 25 also provides that
when the single market stage is achieved, all levies imposed on imports
of agricultural goods shall accrue to the Community."' Presumably
these levies, to the extent they cover fund expenses, will replace mem-
ber state contributions to the fund. Regulation No. 25 does not state
how the fund is to be financed during the period beginning after July 1,
1965, and ending before the achievement of the single market stage.
This was to be the subject of a Council decision to be made by July 1,
1965,"1 but which has not yet been made. At this time, then, there
are no applicable provisions governing the financing of the fund.
2. Payments. As indicated above, the fund is to assume responsi-
bility for (a) certain refunds made for exports to third countries and
(b) intervention measures which member states are obligated to take
under the market organization regulations. After the single market
stage is achieved, the amount of export refunds per product will be the
same irrespective of the member state of origin. 2 ' But during the
transitional stage, export refunds in member states will be higher
where threshold prices are higher, because the amount of the refund
will approximate the difference between the threshold price and the
196 Reg. No. 25 (7)
197 Ibid
198 Reg. No. 25 (8).
199 Reg. No. 17/64 (23) (c)2 0 0 Reg. No. 25(2).
201 Reg. No. 25 (7).
202 Since the refund is equal to the difference between the threshold price and the
world market price, a single Community threshold price will result in a single export
refund. See Commission Reg. No. 90 concerning refunds applicable to grain exports,
J.O.C.E. 1902/62, as amended by Commission Reg. No. 152, J.O.C.E. 2911/62.
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c.i.f. price. The refund for which the fund assumes responsibility,
however, is no more than the "refund rates of the member state whose
average refund is the lowest."" 3 As to intervention purchases, eligible
expenses apparently do not consist of actual amounts spent for inter-
ventions, but rather consist of losses suffered on the denaturing of
grains previously fit for human consumption."" If grains are not dena-
tured, claims may be made for annual losses in value of grain which
has been purchased and stored, but interest and storage costs do not
appear to be eligible as costs which are eligible for assistance from
the fund. 0
When the single market stage is achieved, the entire amount of
"eligible" expenses for third country export refunds and member state
interventions will be the responsibility of the fund.08 For the 1962-
1963, 1963-1964 and 1964-1965 years the fund reimbursed member
states for %, % and % of these expenses, respectively. Before July 1,
1965, the Council was to decide (but did not) what portion of member
state expenses should be borne by the fund for the years beginning
July 1, 1965, and ending when the single market stage was achieved. 7
VII. CommissioN PRoPosALs OF 1965
The situation in June 1965 could be summarized as follows: The
fund had assumed responsibility for one-half of eligible member state
expenses for export refunds and market interventions. All fund assets
came from member state contributions: eighty per cent of the contri-
20 3Reg. No. 25(3). All exports are categorized into a limited number of base
products. Products not conforming exactly to a given base product are converted into
"base product units" by means of equalizing coefficients. For example, if a base product
is grade A maize, one bushel of grade A maize starch might be treated as two bushels
of grade A maize. The total number of units exported is computed and compared
against the total amount of refunds paid on exports of all products falling within the
category in order to determine the "refund rate." The commission can then ascertain
the reimbursement to which the member state is entitled, based on the lowest average
refund rate. Reg. No. 17/64, arts. 2, 4, 8-10. Levies collected on imports from third
countries are offset against export refunds. See also Commission Reg. No. 98/64
concerning requests for reimbursement presented to EAGGF, J.O.C.E. 2113/64.
See Berger, La Place du F.E.O.G.A. dans le Construction de L'Europe 8 REVUE DU
MARcHt Coamur 23, 32-33 (1965).2 0 4 Interventions are defined as actions "having an aim and function identical to third
country export refunds." Reg. No. 17/64, art. 5. Eligibility requires that the actions
be obligatory or "designed to eliminate totally or partially an obligatory action." Ibid.
Denaturing expenses consist of a set cost for technical expenses of denaturing and
90% of the difference between the target price of the wheat or rye denatured and the
target price of good barley. (Denatured wheat and rye cannot be used for food but
can be used as feed grains equal in value to barley.) See Council Reg. No. 18/64 con-
cerning the financing of intervention expenses for grain in the internal market, art.
1(2), J.O.C.E. 595/64 (hereinafter cited as Reg. No. 18/64).
205 Reg. No. 18/64(3).
200 Reg. No. 25 (2).
207 See Reg. No. 25(5).
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butions in the ratio set forth in Treaty article 201 relating to member
state responsibilities for financing generally and twenty per cent in a
ratio determined by the net amount of grain, pork, eggs, poultry and
dairy products each member state imported from third countries. It
was known that when the single market stage was achieved all eligible
expenses for export refunds and interventions would be financed by the
fund.2"8 It was also known that when the single market stage was
achieved, all levies on agricultural imports would accrue to the Com-
munity rather than to individual member states. As to the interim, the
Council was to adopt, by July 1, 1965, regulations relating both to the
fund's income and its expenses.
Although Regulation No. 25 implied that when the single market
stage was reached member state contributions to the fund should be
replaced in part by Community collection of levies imposed on imports
of agricultural products from third countries, such levies will cover
less than half the fund's expenses. Further details concerning financ-
ing, even for the single market stage, therefore had to be elaborated.
The Commission was requested to submit proposals concerning all
these matters by April 1, 1965, and did so on March 31, 1965.2"'
A. Background of the Proposals
There was good reason to hope, during the first half of 1965, that
both a customs union for industrial goods and a single market for
agricultural goods could be achieved by July 1, 1967. The hopes for
an industrial customs union were based on accelerations of (1) the
removal of restrictions to intra-community trade and (2) movements
toward a common external tariff. Similar hopes for agriculture were
raised as a result of the decisions of December 15, 1964, calling for
common grain prices and a single market for grain conversion products
by July 1, 1967. It was true that a single market for agriculture would
also require common guide prices for beef and veal, common reference
and target prices for milk and dairy products, and the elimination of
intra-community levy components designed to protect processers. But
208 The council had agreed on December 15, 1964, that complete Community respon-
sibility for export refunds and market interventions should be assumed by July 1, 1967.
See The Decisions of 15 December 1964, EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, pp. 8, 16.
209 The proposals are contained in Document 27 of Parlement Europ&n Docu-
ments de Sance, April 14, 1965 (hereinafter cited as Document 27). The proposals
were approved, with modifications, by the European Parliament on May 12, 1965.
J.O.C.E. 1660/65. Unless otherwise indicated references are to the proposals con-
tained in Document 27 rather than as modified by the European Parliament. A brief
description of the proposals may also be found in 1965 RxvUE DU MARCHE COMM N
249-51.
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since grain prices influence the price of most agricultural goods, ap-
proximation of those prices was the largest hurdle to overcome. The
overcoming of that hurdle led the Commission to submit to the Council
"Initiative 1964," consisting of proposed decisions and directives call-
ing for (1) the elimination of intra-community tariffs and quotas;
(2) the creation of a common external tariff; and (3) the creation of
the single market stage in agriculture, all by July 1, 1967.210 Though
not then adopted by the Council, the proposals reflected prevailing and
reasonable expectations.21
But although much progress had thus been made toward the achieve-
ment of the first two goals of EEC Commission President Hallstein's
three-stage rocket (customs union; economic union; political union),
movement toward political union had been less remarkable 2" When
the time came for the Commission to propose new regulations governing
the financing of the common agricultural policy, attempts were there-
fore made to give the Community additional powers by proposing
(a) a Community taxing power and (b) a measure of budgetary con-
trol by the European Parliament. It was the political effect of these
proposals that prompted France to withdraw her representatives from
the Council meeting convened to adopt new financing regulations.
B. Content of 1965 Proposals
1. Interim Period. (a) Payments. Regulation No. 25 itself provides
that the fund is to pay all eligible member state intervention and export
refund expenses by the time the single market stage is achieved. The
Commission's proposal would make the fund responsible for % of
these expenses in 1965-1966; % in 1966-1967; and the entire amount
thereafter. 12 The proposal presumes that the single market stage will
be reached by July 1, 1967.14 These proposals would be of great
210 proposals were submitted on January 16, 1965. See Supplement to EEC
Bulletin, Feb., 1965, p. 6. The goals of the commission were first expressed in an In-formation Memo, 1964 Initiative, Communication by the Commission to the Council
and the Member Governments, Oct., 1964, and by a supplementary communication by
te commission to the Council on October 30, 1964, Supplement to EEC Bulletin, 
Jan.,
1965, p. 2. The earlier proposals were more modest than those submitted on January
16.
211 Document 27, Expos6 des Motifs, para. 16.212 See Editorial Comments in 2 C.M.L. Ray. 253, 255 (1964) where it was stated
that "with the start of 1965, the European Community eaters the new year with very
bleak prospects for any form of political union." This bleakness was alleviated some-
what by the Council's decision in March, 1965, to merge the executives of the three
communities. See 77ze Merger of the Executives, EEC Bulletin, April, 1965, pp. 11, 12.
213 Document 27, proposed regulation concerning the financing of the common agri-
cultural policy, art. 2.2314 Document 27, Expos6 des Motifs, para. 6.
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benefit to the main agricultural producers and exporters of the Com-
munity, especially France and the Netherlands. It is estimated that
France will have received about sixty-seven per cent of all fund pay-
ments for export refunds and market interventions in the 1964-1965
marketing year; her contributions to the fund in the same year
amounted to less than twenty-eight per cent of the total amount.
Germany's credits for the same expenses amount to about four per cent
of the total amount while her contributions amounted to over twenty-
eight per cent.21
(b) Receipts. The proposal takes into consideration the December
15, 1964 agreements of the Council relating to the setting of common
grain prices, in which it was agreed that Italy should contribute no
more than eighteen per cent and twenty-two per cent, respectively, of
the fund's requirements in the years 1965-1966 and 1966-1967. -16
Under the proposals, payments of the fund during the interim period
would be covered by financial contributions of member states deter-
mined under the following percentages:
1965-66 1966-67
Belgium 7.96 7.96
Germany 32.35 30.59
France 32.35 30.59
Italy 18 22
Luxembourg 0.22 0.22
Netherlands 9.12 8.64
The contribution ratios for the two years would not be based upon net
imports in any way.217
2. Single Market Stage. Regulation No. 25 already provides that
all eligible payments for export refunds and market interventions shall
be the responsibility of the fund in the single market stage. The Com-
mission's proposals therefore relate primarily to the fund's receipts
during that stage. The proposals are not limited, however, to the
215 France's receipts for export refunds and intervention expenses in the 1962-1963
and 1963-1964 calendar years came to about 88% and 84% respectively. This does not
give the complete picture, however, because 25% of the fund's budget is allocated to
the "guidance" section and used for structural improvements. For a complete listing
of the fund's receipts and payments, see annex to Document 27, Parlement Europeen,
Documents de S'ance, April 14, 1965. The fact that 20% of total payments to the
fund were based on net imports reduced the obligations of France and increased
those of Italy and especially of Germany. Id. at 30.
216 The Decisions of 15 December 1964, in EEC Bulletin, Feb., 1965, pp. 8, 16.
217 Document 27, proposed regulation concerning the financing of the common agri-
cultural policy, art. 3.
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financing of only the fund, but relate rather to the financing of the
entire Community budget.
The Commission proposed that as of July 1, 1967, all levies imposed
on imports of agricultural products from third countries accrue to the
fund.218 The Commission also proposed that customs receipts on imports
of industrial products should also accrue to the fund at progressive
rates, so that by January 1, 1972, all customs duties as well as agri-
cultural levies would be a direct source of Community revenue.219 The
assignment of these revenues by member states to the Community is
a logical consequence of the creation of a single market. After the
customs union is completed, the relation between the place where the
duty or levy is collected and the country of consumption will become
more and more tenuous. If a product destined for German or Italian
consumption goes through a French port, France would, under the
present system, collect the duty or levy. Prior to the existence of a
customs union, exporters would ship directly to the country of con-
sumption in order to avoid a double import duty. In a customs union,
goods will be shipped to the geographically most convenient port.
Unless duties and levies become a Community resource, member states
having the best ports will obtain an undue advantage. The Commis-
sion has stated that:
These receipts [levies and customs duties] can thus no longer
really be credited to the Member State in which is situated the
place of collection, all the more because this State will already
have derived a profit from development and services implied in
its role as the country of transit.22 0
The Commission's proposals concerning assignment of agricultural
levies and customs duties to the Community2 ' would operate in the
following manner: Total Community expenses for the 1967 calendar
year would be computed. One-half of these expenses would be paid by
member states in the ratios set out in the Treaty and in the decisions
concerning the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
This would cover the Community's expenses from January 1 to June
218 Document 27, proposed dispositions to be adopted by the Council under article
201 of the Treaty concerning the replacement of financial contributions of member
states by independent resources of the Community, art. 2(2).211 Id. at art. 3.
220 Document 27, Expos6 des Motifs, para. 9.
221 See note 219 supra. Agricultural levies would not cover the expenses of the
fund. It is estimated that for the 1967-1968 year these levies will amount to about
$600 million and that expenses of the fund will come to between $1.3 billion and $1.7
billion. See Berger, supra note 205, at 36; Friend, What the EEC Agricultural Policy
Would Cost, CCH COMMON MxT. REP. ff 9033, reprinted from Foreign Agriculture,
June 14, 1965; The Economist, May 8, 1965, p. 638.
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30, 1967. As to the remaining half of the expense, all levies collected
on agricultural imports from July 1 to December 31, 1967, would be
assigned to the Community. The remaining deficit would be appor-
tioned among the member states in the same ratio as contribution lia-
bilities for the first half of the year, but would come from duties im-
posed on imports of industrial goods into member states. Any excess
of duties collected would remain at the disposal of the member states.
The percentage of customs duties collected by member states remain-
ing at their disposal would be reduced by one-fifth for each of the
calendar years 1968 through 1972.
This may be illustrated by the following example:
The Community's expenses for 1967 (including payments by the Euro-
pean Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund) amount to 2 billion
dollars. One-half of this amount is contributed by member states in
accordance with the ratio set forth in article 200 of the Treaty (general
expenses) and with the ratio for fund contributions for the 1966-1967
marketing year. Assume that for France the "weighted ratio" amounts
to twenty-nine per cent. Thus, France will contribute, for the first half
of the year, twenty-nine per cent of 1 billion dollars or 290 million
dollars.
The remaining 1 billion dollars will come first from agricultural
levies irrespective of the place of collection. If these levies amount to
a total of 300 million dollars, 700 million dollars remains to be col-
lected. This remaining amount comes from the assignment by member
states to the Community of a part of their customs receipts (other than
agricultural levies) equal to their proportionate contribution ratio for
the first half of the calendar year. Thus France must assign customs
receipts to the Community in the total amount of twenty-nine per cent
of 700 million dollars, or 203 million dollars. If France's total customs
receipts during the second half of 1967 were 507.5 million dollars,
France would have assigned forty per cent of her customs receipts to
the Community, retaining sixty per cent. During each succeeding year,
the amount of customs receipts retained by France would be reduced
by one-fifth, so that by 1972 all customs receipts collected by France
(as well as each other member state) would be assigned to the Com-
munity.
Present estimates indicate that the assignment of all levies and customs
receipts to the Community will give the Community more resources
than it will spend.2
22
The collection of these large sums of money-perhaps exceeding the
2 2 2 1t has been stated that the commission's proposal would give the Community
"resources of $2,400 millions by 1972 . .. far more than it is expected to need at that
time." The Economist, May 8, 1965, p. 638. Time Magazine's estimate that these
revenues "could rise to a formidable $10 billion a year" seems a bit optimistic. Time
Magazine, June 25, 1965, p. 41.
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expenditures of the Community-raises the question of control over
the expenditure of the monies obtained. The lack of popular control
over the acts of the Council of Ministers has already been noted. 23
The proposals of the Commission would lead to a further loss of popu-
lar control by national electorates. Member state revenues, now con-
sisting partly of customs receipts and import levies, are controlled by
national Parliaments subject to popular control. Turning over these
receipts to the Community will deprive the national Parliaments of
their direct power over them. 24 The Commission has therefore pro-
posed an amendment to the Treaty to give the European Parliament a
measure of control over the Community budget. 5 By September 15th
of each year the Commission would submit a proposed budget for the
following calendar year to the Council and to the European Parlia-
ment." ' The Council would then establish, by qualified majority, the
budget for the following calendar year and submit the budget to the
European Parliament by October 15th. " This budget would be con-
sidered the final budget unless amended within one month by a major-
ity of the members of the European Parliament. If amendments are
adopted, the Commission would have to inform the Council within fif-
teen days whether or not it approves of the amendments. If the amend-
ments are approved by the Commission, they would be a part of the
budget unless overruled by five of the six members of the Council of
Ministers; if they are not approved by the Commission, they could be
overruled by the affirmative vote of four of the six members of the
Council. 8
223 See note 58 supra.
224 See Document 27, Expos6 des Motifs, para. 19.2 25 Document 27, Proposed Treaty Modifying articles 201 & 203 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community. The Dutch Parliament has in-
structed its government to pursue attempts to strengthen the Parliament as a condition
to approval of any agricultural financial regulation. See Resolultion of Dutch Parlia-
ment quoted in written question of Mme. Strobel to the commission, J.O.C.E. 1162/65.
A member of the German Bundestag has stated that the commission believed that
national Parliaments would ratify the Treaty amendments called for by the commis-
sion's proposals only if the law-maklng powers which national Parliaments would lose
would be assigned to the European Parliament. Metzger, Der 30 Juni-Ein Schwarzer
Tag fur die EWG, Darmstaedter Echo, July 24, 1965, p. 3, cols. 1-3.22
6 Document 27, Proposed Treaty Modifying articles 201 & 203 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 2. The president of the EEC
Commission has stated that the granting of budgetary powers to the European Parlia-
ment cannot be done by a decision of the Council, but requires an amendment of the
Treaty. EEC Bulletin, Jan., 1964, p. 54.2 2 7 Document 27, art. 2.2 2
8 Ibid. The Parliament had proposed earlier that as to that part of the budget
coming from the Community's own resources (i.e., assigned levies and customs duties),
the Parliament's amendments should be modified only by unanimous vote of the
council. See Resolution Concerning the Strengthening of the Budgetary Powers of
the European Parliament, J.O.C.E. 1263/64.
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One should not infer from the fact that the 1965 Commission pro-
posals are here discussed in detail that they were in fact adopted by the
Council of Ministers. In addition to rejecting the proposals, France
has withdrawn her ministers from Council meetings," 9 thus refusing to
accept the proposals even as a basic for negotiations."' Those elements
of the proposals calling for complete financing of the common agricul-
tural policy by the Community should certainly not have been objec-
tionable to France since she stands to gain most from such financing.
It must therefore be assumed that the objectionable features of the
proposals were the provisions calling for a Community taxing power
and control over the budget by the European Parliament. These pro-
posals are basically political in nature and would lead to a strengthen-
ing of the Community and its institutions at the expense of national
sovereignty. Although DeGaulle's opposition to increasing supranation-
alism in the Common Market is well-known, it may have been thought
that DeGaulle would accept the Commission proposals in return for
Community financing of French intervention purchases and export
refunds. Since he has not done so, the Community must face the ques-
tion of whether these political consequences are the inevitable results
of economic integration. If political integration must progress along
with economic integration, unwillingness of a member state to accept
the political consequences of economic integration could thwart not
only political union but economic integration as well. A rejection of
political integration could lead to the end of further steps to economic
integration. If, on the other hand, economic integration does not require
political union, the Community can be saved if the member states can
agree upon a farm policy which does not include the political provisions
of the Commission's 1965 proposals.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Customs unions by themselves are not enough to bring about the
integration of regulated sectors of the economy such as agriculture.
The Community has concluded that integration of such sectors re-
229 See statement of French Government in Le Monde, July 1, 1965, p. 2, cols. 1
and 2.
230 The proposals themselves were revised by the Commission on July 22, 1965.
These revised proposals would apparently postpone from 1967 to 1970 the substitution
of member-state contributions by direct assignment of levies and customs duties. The
revised proposals do not deal with the issue of Parliamentary control over the budget.
See Metzger, Der 30 Juni-Ein Schwarzer Tax fiir die EWG, Darmstadter Echo, July
24, 1965, p. 3, cols. 1-3. The proposals were not immediately made public, see N.Y.
Times, 27, 1965, p. 8, col. 5, but a summary may be found in European Community,
Aug., 1965, pp. 4-5. Member states other than France have agreed on a financing
proposal. See the Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1965, p. 30, col. 2.
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quires the substitution of supranational for national schemes of regu-
lation. This enables the Community not only to equalize conditions of
competition between producers in different member states, but to insert
a Community policy into the system of regulation as well. For example,
the eventual common prices supported by common intervention pur-
chases will enable the Community to protect Community farmers in
accordance with Community objectives. Production could also be
"guided," for example, by lowering common grain prices and increasing
common guide prices for beef, thus encouraging the production of beef.
Supranational regulation also involves supranational administration,
replacing national bureaucracies in part by Community bureaucracies.
Finally, the creation of a customs union for industry and a single market
for agriculture creates its own stimulus to further integration. When
a single market stage is accomplished, imports from third countries will
go to the best ports. Collection of the customs duties and agricultural
levies by member states where goods are imported, irrespective of
where they are consumed, is unjust. No one would claim that New
York is entitled to customs receipts on goods destined for Indiana
merely because the goods were unloaded in a New York port. In the
Common Market this implies that levies and customs receipts should
be assigned to the Community. The Commission, the European Parlia-
ment and some member states believe that such a taxing unit should
be subject to popular control. These are the logical political conse-
quences of economic integration. It remains to be seen whether Europe
can accept those consequences.
A. Effect of Common Agricultural Policy on World Trade
The common agricultural policy is an extremely protectionist, inward
looking policy. When and if the single market stage is achieved, third
countries will not be able to compete with European producers until
such time as the actual market prices exceed the target price levels or
their equivalent. No matter how cheaply third countries can produce
agricultural goods, they can only sell in the Common Market at a
price somewhat higher than the target prices because the levy imposed
increases to the same degree that c.i.f. prices are lowered. In effect, the
United States will be able to export agricultural products to Europe
only when there is an absolute deficit of the product involved. United
States farmers cannot compete directly with Common Market farmers
in the sense that they can squeeze European farmers off the market by
being more competitive. Only the institutions of the Common Market
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can squeeze farmers off the market. They can do this by lowering tar-
get prices, guide prices, and reference prices. Such a lowering of com-
mon prices by the Community could lead to deficits within Europe and
the possibility of United States exports. The fact of primary economic
importance to American exporters of agricultural produce is the level
of common prices.23' If they are raised, more European farmers will
enter the market, lessening possibilities of deficits within the Commu-
nity. The price decisions of December 15, 1964, point to a common
price level about midway between French and German prices, the high-
est and lowest, respectively, within the Community, and it appears that
increased French production as a result of the high level of prices will
make it very difficult to sell grain and grain conversion products within
the Community. It can of course be argued that high price levels are
against the Common Market's own best interests. If prices were low-
ered, consumers would pay less because of imports from more efficient
foreign producers and European farmers could devote themselves to
activities in which they are more competitive. But economists' theories
about the advantages of free international trade, even if they could be
proven, are of small comfort to the individual farmer threatened with
being forced off his land. It is nevertheless reasonable to hope that the
Community will use its pricing powers in such a manner as to transfer
Community farmers off the land to areas of activity in which they are
more efficient. This will admittedly take a very long time, but if we
are to urge a policy on the Europeans it would seem that suggestions
as to long-range policy would be much more realistic than ad hoc
expressions of annoyance over the existence of the variable levy, or
the institution of such actions as the "chicken war.1
232
231 Trade negotiations under these circumstances must be concerned with more than
tariffs and quotas. The Common Market Commission has offered to negotiate on the
basis of "margins of support." Under the proposals world market reference prices
would be established, and negotiating countries would find themselves not supporting
prices at a stated level beyond the margin of support. For example, if a country
commits itself to a maximum support margin of $30 per metric ton for wheat, and if
the world reference price is set at $70 for wheat, the country making the commitment
cannot support wheat at a price of more than $100 per ton. If the "world reference
price" (determined under stated criteria) falls to $60, the support price must drop to
$90. The commission's proposals also contemplate commodity agreements for certain
items. See Summary of Statement Made by EEC Commission Representative to the
Agricultural Sub-Committee of the GATT Trade Negotiations Committee, Informa-
tion Memo of the European Community, Brussels, Feb., 1964; Address by Sicco Man-
sholt to the National Farm Institute, Des Moines, Iowa, Feb. 11, 1965, European
Community Press Release; Common Market Farm Report, June 15, 1965, p. 1, cols. 1
and 2.
232 The dispute was discussed in detail by an official of the EEC Commission. See
Daleiden, Agricultural Policy and the Import of Poudtry-Meat from the United States,
1 C.M.L. REv. 339 (1963).
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B. Crisis in the Common Market
The political aspects of the Commission's 1965 proposals (relating
to the direct assignment of duties and levies to the Community and the
powers of the European Parliament) which precipitated the current
crisis in the Common Market, arose out of the implementation of the
common agricultural policy, but were not a necessary part of it. The
agricultural policy requires a financing of the European Agriculture
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, but this financing does not have to
come from a direct Community collection of agricultural levies, much
less a Community collection of customs receipts on industrial imports.
Nor does the common agricultural policy require that the European.
Parliament be given control over the Community budget. While it may
be true that the Commission asked France to agree to a European
Parliament with increased powers and to the creation of a Community
taxing power, as a quid pro quo for financing France's expenditures for
market interventions and export refunds,"' the Community and also
its common agricultural policy can continue to exist without these addi-
tional powers. The issues raised by the Commission's proposals cannot
of course be avoided indefinitely. Germany might not tolerate, for
example, a situation where France collects duties on goods shipped to
French ports for trans-shipment to German consumers. But the degree
to which this would occur within the Community has not been ascer-
tainied. If such a situation becomes commonplace, devices for alloca-
tion of customs receipts to consuming member states could be adopted.
If no assignments of revenues to the Community are made, the need for
increasing the powers of the European Parliament becomes less imme-
diate. Allocating revenues directly to the Community and increasing
the powers of the European Parliament may be desirable ends in them-
selves, but would not appear to be necessary to the creation of a single
agricultural market. The real question then is probably not whether
the Community will survive the present crisis, but whether it will obtain
the additional political powers envisioned in the proposals of the
Commission.
The Common Market is in a difficult crisis. It is popular to level the
blame for this crisis upon France. 34 But France has always regarded
a common agricultural policy and a Community financing of that policy
as a quid pro quo for agreeing to lower her tariffs on industrial goods
233 See The Economist, May 8, 1965, p. 638.
234 See resume of editorial comments of European and American newspapers in Le
Monde, July 3, 1965, p. 3.
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from other member states." 5 The fact that tariff-reduction has gone on
ahead of schedule shows that France has kept her part of this bargain.
In return, France has always insisted upon full implementation of the
agricultural policy. For this reason, adoption of the 1962 common
market organizations was made a condition of entering into the second
stage of the transitional period. The adoption of Regulation No. 25 at
that time involved a Community commitment to adopt final financial
regulations by July 1, 1965. What the Commission has done is to tie its
agricultural financing proposals to other conditions (assignment of
revenues to the Community and granting of budgetary powers to the
Parliament) which France feels could be decided separately from the
immediate issue of the financing of the agricultural policy. France's
argument is thus that the Community made an unconditional commit-
ment in 1962 concerning the implementation and financing of the farm
policy, and has now attached conditions to that commitment. That
France's position is not completely unreasonable is evidenced by the
fact that at least one ardent European, Paul Henri Spaak, approved
it."' Despite all this, of course, France has been made to appear the
uncooperative partner in the present crisis. Perhaps she is. But the
crisis could probably be overcome by a financing proposal which does
not grant budgetary power to the European Parliament and which does
not assign levy and customs revenues to the Community. However
desirable these latter two objectives may be, they are not a sine qua
non of either the agricultural policy or the Common Market.
235 The Common Market has been referred to as "a bargain between French agri-
culture and German industry." LIPPMAN, WESTERN UNITY AND THE C OMON MARKET
14 (1962).
236 See European Community, Aug., 1965, p. 2.
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